I have a feeling that you’re overstretching this notion of objectivity. It doesn’t matter, though. Specialness doesn’t enter into it. What is specialness, anyway? Clippy doesn’t want to do special things, or to fulfill special beings’ preferences. Clippy wants there to be as many paper clips as possible.
Says who? First you say that Clippy’ Clipping-drive is a brute fact, then you say it is a desire it wants to have, that is has higher-order ramifications.
It does. Clippy’s stopping to care about paper clips is arguably not conducive there being more paperclips, so from Clippy’s caring about paper clips, it follows that Clippy doesn’t want to be altered so that it doesn’t care about paper clips anymore.
Kantian ethics includes post-Kant Kant-style ethics, Rawls, Habermas, etc. Perhaps they felt they could improve on his arguments.
Yes, but those people don’t try to make such weird arguments as you find in the Groundwork, where Kant essentially tries to get morality out of thin air.
I think that breaks down into what is subjective specialness, and what is objective specialness.
Clippy wants there to be as many paper clips as possible.
Which is to implicitly treat them as special or valuable in some way.
Clippy’s stopping to care about paper clips is arguably not conducive there being more paperclips, so from Clippy’s caring about paper clips, it follows that Clippy doesn’t want to be altered so that it doesn’t care about paper clips anymore.
Which leaves Clippy in a quandary. Clippy can’t predict which self modifications might lead to Clippy ceasing to care about clips, so if Clippy takes a conservative approach and never self-modifies, Clippy remains inefficient and no threat to anyone.
I think that breaks down into what is subjective specialness, and what is objective specialness.
What kind of answer is that?
Which is to implicitly treat them as special or valuable in some way.
Well, then we have it: they are special. Clippy does not want them because they are special. Clippy wants them, period. Brute fact. If that makes them special, well, you have all the more problem.
Clippy can’t predict which self modifications might lead to Clippy ceasing to care about clips
I have a feeling that you’re overstretching this notion of objectivity. It doesn’t matter, though. Specialness doesn’t enter into it. What is specialness, anyway? Clippy doesn’t want to do special things, or to fulfill special beings’ preferences. Clippy wants there to be as many paper clips as possible.
It does. Clippy’s stopping to care about paper clips is arguably not conducive there being more paperclips, so from Clippy’s caring about paper clips, it follows that Clippy doesn’t want to be altered so that it doesn’t care about paper clips anymore.
Yes, but those people don’t try to make such weird arguments as you find in the Groundwork, where Kant essentially tries to get morality out of thin air.
I think that breaks down into what is subjective specialness, and what is objective specialness.
Which is to implicitly treat them as special or valuable in some way.
Which leaves Clippy in a quandary. Clippy can’t predict which self modifications might lead to Clippy ceasing to care about clips, so if Clippy takes a conservative approach and never self-modifies, Clippy remains inefficient and no threat to anyone.
What kind of answer is that?
Well, then we have it: they are special. Clippy does not want them because they are special. Clippy wants them, period. Brute fact. If that makes them special, well, you have all the more problem.
Says who?
Subjectively, but not objectively.
Whoever failed to equip Clippy with the appropriate oracle when stipulating Clippy.