My point was that we have no uncertainty about any physical processes involved, only about why we experience what we do. We aren’t uncertain about why classical computers are classical, or why L2-typical observers would experience classical probabilities.
The fact that you experience the outcomes of physical experiments at all requires explanation. I don’t see why that explanation is easier if you use probabilities or counting measure (especially given an infinite universe) rather than amplitude. It seems like bad form to absorb confusion about the hard problem of consciousness into confusion about physics, given that I at least cannot imagine any physics that would resolve my confusion about consciousness.
My point was that we have no uncertainty about any physical processes involved, only about why we experience what we do. We aren’t uncertain about why classical computers are classical, or why L2-typical observers would experience classical probabilities.
The fact that you experience the outcomes of physical experiments at all requires explanation. I don’t see why that explanation is easier if you use probabilities or counting measure (especially given an infinite universe) rather than amplitude. It seems like bad form to absorb confusion about the hard problem of consciousness into confusion about physics, given that I at least cannot imagine any physics that would resolve my confusion about consciousness.