And as I’ve argued before, that only follows if the a) the subject is given an arbitrarily large number of repeats of that choice, and b) their preference for one over the other is interpreted as them writing an arbitrarily large number of option contracts trading one for the other.
If—as is the case when people actually answer the Allais problem as presented—they merely show a one-shot preference for one over the other, it does not follow that they have an inconsistent utility function, or that they can be money-pumped. When you do the experiment again and again, you get the expected value. When you don’t, you don’t.
If making the “wrong” choice when presented with two high-probability, high-payoff lottery tickets is exploitation, I don’t want to be empowered. (You can quote me on that.)
Yes, but I can’t find it at the moment—it came up later, and apparently people do get money-pumped even on repeated versions. The point about what inferences you can draw from a one-shot stands though.
If making the “wrong” choice when presented with two high-probability, high-payoff lottery tickets is exploitation, I don’t want to be empowered. (You can quote me on that.)
Not very quotable, but I may be tempted to do so anyway.
Aw, come on! Don’t you see? “If X is wrong, I don’t want to be right”, but then using exploitation and empowerment as the opposites instead?
Anyway, do you get the general point about how the money pump only manifests in multiple trials over the same person, which weren’t studied in the experiments, and how Eliezer_Yudkowsky’s argument subtly equates a one-time preference with a many-time preference for writing lots of option contracts?
And as I’ve argued before, that only follows if the a) the subject is given an arbitrarily large number of repeats of that choice, and b) their preference for one over the other is interpreted as them writing an arbitrarily large number of option contracts trading one for the other.
If—as is the case when people actually answer the Allais problem as presented—they merely show a one-shot preference for one over the other, it does not follow that they have an inconsistent utility function, or that they can be money-pumped. When you do the experiment again and again, you get the expected value. When you don’t, you don’t.
If making the “wrong” choice when presented with two high-probability, high-payoff lottery tickets is exploitation, I don’t want to be empowered. (You can quote me on that.)
This is what I’m thinking, too. Curious, since you say you’ve argued this before, did Eliezer ever address this argument anywhere?
Yes, but I can’t find it at the moment—it came up later, and apparently people do get money-pumped even on repeated versions. The point about what inferences you can draw from a one-shot stands though.
Not very quotable, but I may be tempted to do so anyway.
Aw, come on! Don’t you see? “If X is wrong, I don’t want to be right”, but then using exploitation and empowerment as the opposites instead?
Anyway, do you get the general point about how the money pump only manifests in multiple trials over the same person, which weren’t studied in the experiments, and how Eliezer_Yudkowsky’s argument subtly equates a one-time preference with a many-time preference for writing lots of option contracts?
Yep.
Rockin.