So when you’re talking about decision theory and your intuitions come into conflict with the math, listen to the math.
I think you’re overselling your case a little here. The cool thing about theorems is that their conclusions follow from their premises. If you then try to apply the theorem to the real world and someone dislikes the conclusion, the appropriate response isn’t “well it’s math, so you can’t do that,” it’s “tell me which of my premises you dislike.”
An additional issue here is premises which are not explicitly stated. For example, there’s an implicit premise in your post of there being some fixed collection of agents with some fixed collection of preferences that you want to aggregate. Not pointing out this premise explicitly leaves your implied social policy potentially vulnerable to various attacks involving creating agents, destroying agents, or modifying agents, as I’ve pointed out in other comments.
I suggest the VNM Expected Utility Theorem and this theorem should be used as a test on potential FAI researchers. Is their reaction to these theorems “of course, the FAI has to be designed that way” or “that’s a cool piece of math, now let’s see if we can’t break it somehow”? Maybe you don’t need everyone on the research team to instinctively have the latter reaction, but I think you definitely want to make sure at least some do. (I wonder what von Neumann’s reaction was to his own theorem...)
I think you’re overselling your case a little here. The cool thing about theorems is that their conclusions follow from their premises. If you then try to apply the theorem to the real world and someone dislikes the conclusion, the appropriate response isn’t “well it’s math, so you can’t do that,” it’s “tell me which of my premises you dislike.”
That’s a good point. I agree, and I’ve edited my post to reflect that.
An additional issue here is premises which are not explicitly stated. For example, there’s an implicit premise in your post of there being some fixed collection of agents with some fixed collection of preferences that you want to aggregate. Not pointing out this premise explicitly leaves your implied social policy potentially vulnerable to various attacks involving creating agents, destroying agents, or modifying agents, as I’ve pointed out in other comments.
I thought I was being explicit about that when I was writing it, but looking at my post again, I now see that I was not. I’ve edited it to try to clarify that.
I think you’re overselling your case a little here. The cool thing about theorems is that their conclusions follow from their premises. If you then try to apply the theorem to the real world and someone dislikes the conclusion, the appropriate response isn’t “well it’s math, so you can’t do that,” it’s “tell me which of my premises you dislike.”
An additional issue here is premises which are not explicitly stated. For example, there’s an implicit premise in your post of there being some fixed collection of agents with some fixed collection of preferences that you want to aggregate. Not pointing out this premise explicitly leaves your implied social policy potentially vulnerable to various attacks involving creating agents, destroying agents, or modifying agents, as I’ve pointed out in other comments.
I suggest the VNM Expected Utility Theorem and this theorem should be used as a test on potential FAI researchers. Is their reaction to these theorems “of course, the FAI has to be designed that way” or “that’s a cool piece of math, now let’s see if we can’t break it somehow”? Maybe you don’t need everyone on the research team to instinctively have the latter reaction, but I think you definitely want to make sure at least some do. (I wonder what von Neumann’s reaction was to his own theorem...)
That’s a good point. I agree, and I’ve edited my post to reflect that.
I thought I was being explicit about that when I was writing it, but looking at my post again, I now see that I was not. I’ve edited it to try to clarify that.
Thanks for pointing those out.