Is it a selfish utility-maximizer? Can its definition of utility change under any circumstances? Does it care about absolute or relative gains, or does it have some rule for trading off absolute against relative gains?
The agent just wants to maximize their expected payoff in the game. They don’t care about the other agents’ payoffs.
Do the agents in the negotiation have perfect information about the external situation?
The agents know the action spaces and payoff matrix. There may be sources of randomness they can use to implement mixed strategies, and they can’t predict these.
Do they know each others’ decision logic?
This is the part I don’t know how to define. They should have some accurate counterfactual beliefs about what the other agent will do, but they shouldn’t be logically omniscient.
This is achieved (in a model) by making them the same: then they can ask “what would I do if I was in X’s shoes?” instead of “what would X do in situation Y?”.
The agent just wants to maximize their expected payoff in the game. They don’t care about the other agents’ payoffs.
The agents know the action spaces and payoff matrix. There may be sources of randomness they can use to implement mixed strategies, and they can’t predict these.
This is the part I don’t know how to define. They should have some accurate counterfactual beliefs about what the other agent will do, but they shouldn’t be logically omniscient.
This is achieved (in a model) by making them the same: then they can ask “what would I do if I was in X’s shoes?” instead of “what would X do in situation Y?”.