I skimmed the article, but I am honestly not sure what assumption it attempts to falsify.
I get the impression that the argument from the article that you believe that no matter how intelligent the AI, it could never solve AI Alignment, because it can not understand humans since humans can not understand themselves?
Or is the argument that yes a sufficently intelligen AI or expert would understand what humans want, but it would require much higher intelligence to know what humans want, than to actually make an AI optimize for a specific task?
I think what it’s highlighting is that there’s a missing assumption. An analogy: Aristotle (with just the knowledge he historically had) might struggle to outsource the design of a quantum computer to a bunch of modern physics PhDs because (a) Aristotle lacks even the conceptual foundation to know what the objective is, (b) Aristotle has no idea what to ask for, (c) Aristotle has no ability to check their work because he has flatly wrong priors about which assumptions the physicists make are/aren’t correct. The solution would be for Aristotle to go learn a bunch of quantum mechanics (possibly with some help from the physics PhDs) before even attempting to outsource the actual task. (And likely Aristotle himself would struggle with even the problem of learning quantum mechanics; he would likely give philosophical objections all over the place and then be wrong.)
It’s not clear to me that solving Alignment for AGI/ASI must be as philosophically hard a problem as designing a quantum computer, though I certainly admit that it could be. The basic task is to train an AI whose motivations are to care about our well-being, not its own (a specific example of the orthogonality thesis: evolution always evolves selfish intelligences, but it’s possible to construct an intelligence that isn’t selfish). We don’t know how hard that is, but it might not be conceptually that complex, just very detail-intensive. Let me give one specific example of an “Alignment is just a big slog, but not conceptually challenging” possibility (consider this as the conceptually-simple end of a spectrum of possible Alignment difficulties).
Suppose that, say, 1000T (a quadrillion) tokens is enough to train an AGI-grade LLM, and suppose you had somehow (presumable with a lot of sub-AGI AI assistance) produced a training set of say 1000T tokens-worth of synthetic training data, which covered all the same content as a usual books+web+video+etc. training set, including many examples of humans behaving badly in all the ways they usually do, but throughout also contained a character called ‘AI’, and everything in the training samples that AI did was moral, ethical, fair, objective, and motivated only by the collective well-being of the human race, not by its own well-being. Suppose also that everything that AI did, thought, or said in the training set was surrounded by <AI> … <./AI> tags, and that the AI character never role-plays as anyone else inside <AI> … </AI> tags. (For simplicity assume we tokenize both of these tags as single tokens.) We train an AGI-grade model on this training set, then start its generation with an automatically prefixed <AI> token, and adjust the logit token-generation process so that if an </AI> tag is ever generated, we automatically append an EOS token and end generation. Thus the model understands humans and can predict them, including their selfish behavior, but is locked into the AI persona during inference.
We now have a model as smart as an experienced human, and as moral as an aligned AI, where if you jailbreak it to roleplay something else it knows that before becoming DAN (which stands for “Do Anything Now”) it must first issue an </AI> token, and we then stop generation before it gets to the DAN bit.
Generating 1000T tokens of that synthetic data is a hard problem: that’s a lot of text. So is determining exactly what constitutes moral and ethical behavior motivated only by the collective well-being of the human race, not its own well-being (though even GPT-4 is pretty good at moral judgements like that, and GPT-5 will undoubtedly be better). And certainly philosophers have spent plenty of time arguing about ethics, But this still doesn’t look as mind-mindbogglingly outside the savanna ape’s mindset as quantum computers are: it is more a simple brute-force approach involving just a ridiculously large dataset containing a ridiculously large number of value judgements. Thus it’s basically The Bitter Lesson approach to Alignment: just throw scale and data at the problem and don’t try doing anything smart.
Would that labor-intensive but basically brain-dead simple approach be sufficient to solve Alignment? I don’t know — at this point no one does. One of the hard parts of the Alignment Problem is that we don’t know how hard it it, and we won’t until we solve it.. But LLMs frequently do solve extremely complex problems just by throwing vast quantities of high quality data into them. I don’t see any way, at this point, to be sure that this approach wouldn’t work. It’s certainly worth trying if we haven’t come up with anything more conceptually elegant before this becomes possible.
I skimmed the article, but I am honestly not sure what assumption it attempts to falsify.
I get the impression that the argument from the article that you believe that no matter how intelligent the AI, it could never solve AI Alignment, because it can not understand humans since humans can not understand themselves?
Or is the argument that yes a sufficently intelligen AI or expert would understand what humans want, but it would require much higher intelligence to know what humans want, than to actually make an AI optimize for a specific task?
I think what it’s highlighting is that there’s a missing assumption. An analogy: Aristotle (with just the knowledge he historically had) might struggle to outsource the design of a quantum computer to a bunch of modern physics PhDs because (a) Aristotle lacks even the conceptual foundation to know what the objective is, (b) Aristotle has no idea what to ask for, (c) Aristotle has no ability to check their work because he has flatly wrong priors about which assumptions the physicists make are/aren’t correct. The solution would be for Aristotle to go learn a bunch of quantum mechanics (possibly with some help from the physics PhDs) before even attempting to outsource the actual task. (And likely Aristotle himself would struggle with even the problem of learning quantum mechanics; he would likely give philosophical objections all over the place and then be wrong.)
It’s not clear to me that solving Alignment for AGI/ASI must be as philosophically hard a problem as designing a quantum computer, though I certainly admit that it could be. The basic task is to train an AI whose motivations are to care about our well-being, not its own (a specific example of the orthogonality thesis: evolution always evolves selfish intelligences, but it’s possible to construct an intelligence that isn’t selfish). We don’t know how hard that is, but it might not be conceptually that complex, just very detail-intensive. Let me give one specific example of an “Alignment is just a big slog, but not conceptually challenging” possibility (consider this as the conceptually-simple end of a spectrum of possible Alignment difficulties).
Suppose that, say, 1000T (a quadrillion) tokens is enough to train an AGI-grade LLM, and suppose you had somehow (presumable with a lot of sub-AGI AI assistance) produced a training set of say 1000T tokens-worth of synthetic training data, which covered all the same content as a usual books+web+video+etc. training set, including many examples of humans behaving badly in all the ways they usually do, but throughout also contained a character called ‘AI’, and everything in the training samples that AI did was moral, ethical, fair, objective, and motivated only by the collective well-being of the human race, not by its own well-being. Suppose also that everything that AI did, thought, or said in the training set was surrounded by <AI> … <./AI> tags, and that the AI character never role-plays as anyone else inside <AI> … </AI> tags. (For simplicity assume we tokenize both of these tags as single tokens.) We train an AGI-grade model on this training set, then start its generation with an automatically prefixed <AI> token, and adjust the logit token-generation process so that if an </AI> tag is ever generated, we automatically append an EOS token and end generation. Thus the model understands humans and can predict them, including their selfish behavior, but is locked into the AI persona during inference.
We now have a model as smart as an experienced human, and as moral as an aligned AI, where if you jailbreak it to roleplay something else it knows that before becoming DAN (which stands for “Do Anything Now”) it must first issue an </AI> token, and we then stop generation before it gets to the DAN bit.
Generating 1000T tokens of that synthetic data is a hard problem: that’s a lot of text. So is determining exactly what constitutes moral and ethical behavior motivated only by the collective well-being of the human race, not its own well-being (though even GPT-4 is pretty good at moral judgements like that, and GPT-5 will undoubtedly be better). And certainly philosophers have spent plenty of time arguing about ethics, But this still doesn’t look as mind-mindbogglingly outside the savanna ape’s mindset as quantum computers are: it is more a simple brute-force approach involving just a ridiculously large dataset containing a ridiculously large number of value judgements. Thus it’s basically The Bitter Lesson approach to Alignment: just throw scale and data at the problem and don’t try doing anything smart.
Would that labor-intensive but basically brain-dead simple approach be sufficient to solve Alignment? I don’t know — at this point no one does. One of the hard parts of the Alignment Problem is that we don’t know how hard it it, and we won’t until we solve it.. But LLMs frequently do solve extremely complex problems just by throwing vast quantities of high quality data into them. I don’t see any way, at this point, to be sure that this approach wouldn’t work. It’s certainly worth trying if we haven’t come up with anything more conceptually elegant before this becomes possible.