I still think that Caplan’s position is dumb. It’s not so much a question of whether his explanation fits the data (although I think Psychohistorian has shown that in this case it does not), it’s that it’s just plain weird to characterize the obsessive behavior done by people with OCD as a “preference”. I mean, suppose that you were able to modify the explanation you’ve offered (that OCD people just have high preferences for certainty) in a way that escapes Psychohistorian’s criticism. Suppose, for instance, you simply say “OCD people just have a strong desire for things happening a prime number of times”. This would still be silly! OCD people clearly have a minor defect in their brains, and redefining “preference” won’t change this.
Ultimately, this might just be a matter of semantics. Caplan may be using “preference” to mean “a contrived utility function which happens to fit the data”, which can always be done so long as the behavior isn’t contradictory. But this really isn’t helpful. After all, I can say that the willow’s “preference” is to lean in the direction of the wind and this will correctly describe the Willow’s behavior. But calling it a preference is silly.
Thanks for the comment. This discussion has helped to clarify my thinking.
I still think that Caplan’s position is dumb. It’s not so much a question of whether his explanation fits the data (although I think Psychohistorian has shown that in this case it does not), it’s that it’s just plain weird to characterize the obsessive behavior done by people with OCD as a “preference”. I mean, suppose that you were able to modify the explanation you’ve offered (that OCD people just have high preferences for certainty) in a way that escapes Psychohistorian’s criticism. Suppose, for instance, you simply say “OCD people just have a strong desire for things happening a prime number of times”. This would still be silly! OCD people clearly have a minor defect in their brains, and redefining “preference” won’t change this.
Ultimately, this might just be a matter of semantics. Caplan may be using “preference” to mean “a contrived utility function which happens to fit the data”, which can always be done so long as the behavior isn’t contradictory. But this really isn’t helpful. After all, I can say that the willow’s “preference” is to lean in the direction of the wind and this will correctly describe the Willow’s behavior. But calling it a preference is silly.
Thanks for the comment. This discussion has helped to clarify my thinking.