If consciousness has a physical effect, the zombie would have some other law of physics fill in and play the functional role of consciousness.
If zombie has additional physical law it’s not physically identical. More generally, what do you even mean for something to be not physical and have casual effect on physical world? If there is casual effect, you can have equations about it.
No neuroscientific knowledge can communicate what it’s like to see red, for one who has never seen red.
You either define knowledge such as it can communicate what it’s like to see red, or it also can’t communicate how to ride a bicycle. Either way it’s just confusion between knowing about state and being in a state, not an argument against physicality of bicycles or consciousness.
If zombie has additional physical law it’s not physically identical. More generally, what do you even mean for something to be not physical and have casual effect on physical world? If there is casual effect, you can have equations about it.
Only if it is susceptible to mathematical description.
Either way it’s just confusion between knowing about state and being in a state, not an argument against physicality of bicycles or consciousness.
Physicalism doesn’t imply that you get extra knowledge by personally instantiating something.
Only if it is susceptible to mathematical description.
What isn’t?
Physicalism doesn’t imply that you get extra knowledge by personally instantiating something.
Then either “what it’s like to see red” is not knowledge, like how to ride a bicycle, or this kind of physicalism can’t explains bicycles and you should use better one.
If zombie has additional physical law it’s not physically identical. More generally, what do you even mean for something to be not physical and have casual effect on physical world? If there is casual effect, you can have equations about it.
You either define knowledge such as it can communicate what it’s like to see red, or it also can’t communicate how to ride a bicycle. Either way it’s just confusion between knowing about state and being in a state, not an argument against physicality of bicycles or consciousness.
Only if it is susceptible to mathematical description.
Physicalism doesn’t imply that you get extra knowledge by personally instantiating something.
What isn’t?
Then either “what it’s like to see red” is not knowledge, like how to ride a bicycle, or this kind of physicalism can’t explains bicycles and you should use better one.
Qualia.
It isn’t. There is no reason it should be know-how