I agree: accurate is better than clever. (And, for the avoidance of doubt, I wasn’t meaning to argue that omnizoid’s choice of title is a good one.)
I’m not sure whether I think it’s fair to call the two things omnizoid is complaining about “dogmas of LW”. Physicalism about consciousness is certainly pretty widely and confidently accepted around here. Moral nonrealism I’m not so sure about. It doesn’t seem entirely unreasonable to suggest that these things are viewed on LW in something like the way the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism were viewed among empiricist philosophers when Quine wrote “Two Dogmas”.
Quine’s paper is much more interesting than omnizoid’s because (1) he makes better arguments and (2) he is arguing for a thesis more like “this stuff is subtler than everyone thinks” than like “you guys are straightforwardly wrong and one of the standard alternatives to your view is correct instead” and actually bringing some new ideas to the table, which I don’t really think omnizoid is doing.
It doesn’t seem entirely unreasonable to suggest that these things are viewed on LW in something like the way the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism were viewed among empiricist philosophers when Quine wrote “Two Dogmas”
That’s fair. I can grant that. Like you, I’m less sure about the general attitude towards moral realism here. I’d have thought inclinations were more towards dissolve-the-dispute than a decidedly antirealist stance. I’d be interested in finding out more about people’s metaethical views on LW.
I agree: accurate is better than clever. (And, for the avoidance of doubt, I wasn’t meaning to argue that omnizoid’s choice of title is a good one.)
I’m not sure whether I think it’s fair to call the two things omnizoid is complaining about “dogmas of LW”. Physicalism about consciousness is certainly pretty widely and confidently accepted around here. Moral nonrealism I’m not so sure about. It doesn’t seem entirely unreasonable to suggest that these things are viewed on LW in something like the way the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism were viewed among empiricist philosophers when Quine wrote “Two Dogmas”.
Quine’s paper is much more interesting than omnizoid’s because (1) he makes better arguments and (2) he is arguing for a thesis more like “this stuff is subtler than everyone thinks” than like “you guys are straightforwardly wrong and one of the standard alternatives to your view is correct instead” and actually bringing some new ideas to the table, which I don’t really think omnizoid is doing.
That’s fair. I can grant that. Like you, I’m less sure about the general attitude towards moral realism here. I’d have thought inclinations were more towards dissolve-the-dispute than a decidedly antirealist stance. I’d be interested in finding out more about people’s metaethical views on LW.