You’ll get no disagreement from me. I’m a proponent of the view that standard accounts of moral realism are typically either unintelligible (non-naturalist accounts usually, or any accounts that maintain that there are irreducibly normative facts, or categorical reasons, or external reasons, etc.), or trivial (naturalist realist accounts that reduce moral facts to descriptive claims that have normative authority).
Surprisingly, the claim that moral realism isn’t coherent is not popular in contemporary metaethics and I almost never see anyone arguing for it, aside from myself, so it’s nice to see someone make a similar claim.
Thanks for clarifying.
You’ll get no disagreement from me. I’m a proponent of the view that standard accounts of moral realism are typically either unintelligible (non-naturalist accounts usually, or any accounts that maintain that there are irreducibly normative facts, or categorical reasons, or external reasons, etc.), or trivial (naturalist realist accounts that reduce moral facts to descriptive claims that have normative authority).
Surprisingly, the claim that moral realism isn’t coherent is not popular in contemporary metaethics and I almost never see anyone arguing for it, aside from myself, so it’s nice to see someone make a similar claim.