I wasn’t trying to make the case for deontology, no—just trying to clear up the worst of the misapprehensions about it. Which is that it’s not just consequentialism in Kantian clothing, it’s a whole other thing that you can’t properly understand without getting rid of some consequentialist baggage.
There does not have to be a causal linkage between one’s individual actions and those of the rest of the world. (Note: my ethics don’t include a counterfactual component, so I’m representing a generalized picture of others’ views here.) It’s simply not about what your actions will cause! A counterfactual telling you that your action is un-universalizeable can be informative to a deontic evaluation of an act even if you perform the act in complete secrecy. It can be informative even if the world is about to end and your act will have no consequences at all beyond being the act it is. It can be informative even if you’d never have dreamed of performing the act were it a common act type (in fact, especially then!). The counterfactual is a place to stop. It is, if justificatory at all, inherently justificatory.
A counterfactual telling you that your action is un-universalizeable can be informative to a deontic evaluation of an act even if you perform the act in complete secrecy. It can be informative even if etc.
Okay, I get that. But what does it inform you of? Why should one care in particular about the universalizability of one’s actions?
I don’t want to just come down to asking “Why should I be moral?”, because I already think there is no good answer to that question. But why this particular picture of morality?
I don’t have an arsenal with which to defend the universalizeability thing; I don’t use it, as I said. Kant seems to me to think that performing only universalizeable actions is a constraint on rationality; don’t ask me how he got to that—if I had to use a CI formulation I’d go with the “treat people as ends in themselves” one.
But why this particular picture of morality?
It suits some intuitions very nicely. If it doesn’t suit yours, fine; I just want people to stop trying to cram mine into boxes that are the wrong shape.
I wasn’t trying to make the case for deontology, no—just trying to clear up the worst of the misapprehensions about it. Which is that it’s not just consequentialism in Kantian clothing, it’s a whole other thing that you can’t properly understand without getting rid of some consequentialist baggage.
There does not have to be a causal linkage between one’s individual actions and those of the rest of the world. (Note: my ethics don’t include a counterfactual component, so I’m representing a generalized picture of others’ views here.) It’s simply not about what your actions will cause! A counterfactual telling you that your action is un-universalizeable can be informative to a deontic evaluation of an act even if you perform the act in complete secrecy. It can be informative even if the world is about to end and your act will have no consequences at all beyond being the act it is. It can be informative even if you’d never have dreamed of performing the act were it a common act type (in fact, especially then!). The counterfactual is a place to stop. It is, if justificatory at all, inherently justificatory.
Okay, I get that. But what does it inform you of? Why should one care in particular about the universalizability of one’s actions?
I don’t want to just come down to asking “Why should I be moral?”, because I already think there is no good answer to that question. But why this particular picture of morality?
I don’t have an arsenal with which to defend the universalizeability thing; I don’t use it, as I said. Kant seems to me to think that performing only universalizeable actions is a constraint on rationality; don’t ask me how he got to that—if I had to use a CI formulation I’d go with the “treat people as ends in themselves” one.
It suits some intuitions very nicely. If it doesn’t suit yours, fine; I just want people to stop trying to cram mine into boxes that are the wrong shape.
I suppose that’s about as good as we’re going to get with moral theories!
Well, I hope I haven’t caused you too much corner-sobbing; thanks for explaining.