One of the findings they discussed was that not only did experts have lower accuracy than the statistically generated rules, when given the result of the rule and the option to defect from its prediction they were much more likely to chose to defect when the rule was right and they were wrong than the other way around.
Ok, I haven’t read the book. But doesn’t the second statement follow logically from the first? Both seem equivalent to saying that when the experts disagreed with the rule, the rule was right more often than they were.
But doesn’t the second statement follow logically from the first? Both seem equivalent to saying that when the experts disagreed with the rule, the rule was right more often than they were.
Short answer: Yes, but people need help being logical.
Long answer: I lent out my copy, so I can’t check that section of the book, but if I remember correctly there was a big discussion how the experts, for almost every time they chose to defect, had come up with a long rationalization of why their defection was appropriate for this circumstance. The experts thought there were factors that didn’t go into the model which were strongly relevant, and so on.
But, whenever that was true, that was generally something that could be introduced into the model, and the model would outperform the experts again.
It needs to be discussed explicitly because people hate the idea of not being able to switch to manual control. “Ok, maybe it’s better at guessing than I am, but what if I know it’s making the wrong choice?” The answer is “sorry, no, you don’t know that at all.” And that is so painful that, for most people, it needs to be swallowed separately. You don’t need to believe you believe the rule is better, you need to believe the rule is better.
I think the first finding was that experts did worse than the rule, when they weren’t given the predictions of the rules; the second was that they still did worse than the rule when given its prediction in advance of answering.
Ok, I haven’t read the book. But doesn’t the second statement follow logically from the first? Both seem equivalent to saying that when the experts disagreed with the rule, the rule was right more often than they were.
Short answer: Yes, but people need help being logical.
Long answer: I lent out my copy, so I can’t check that section of the book, but if I remember correctly there was a big discussion how the experts, for almost every time they chose to defect, had come up with a long rationalization of why their defection was appropriate for this circumstance. The experts thought there were factors that didn’t go into the model which were strongly relevant, and so on.
But, whenever that was true, that was generally something that could be introduced into the model, and the model would outperform the experts again.
It needs to be discussed explicitly because people hate the idea of not being able to switch to manual control. “Ok, maybe it’s better at guessing than I am, but what if I know it’s making the wrong choice?” The answer is “sorry, no, you don’t know that at all.” And that is so painful that, for most people, it needs to be swallowed separately. You don’t need to believe you believe the rule is better, you need to believe the rule is better.
I think the first finding was that experts did worse than the rule, when they weren’t given the predictions of the rules; the second was that they still did worse than the rule when given its prediction in advance of answering.