Game theory in these setting is built on subjective probabilities! The standard solution concept in incomplete-information games is even known as Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The LMSR is stronger strategically than Nash equilibrium, assuming everyone participates only once. In that case, it’s a dominant strategy to be honest, rather than just a best response. If people participate multiple times, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is harder to characterize. See Gao et al (2013)] for the best current description, which roughly says you shouldn’t reveal any information until the very last moment. The paper has an overview of the LMSR for anyone interested.
Game theory in these setting is built on subjective probabilities! The standard solution concept in incomplete-information games is even known as Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The LMSR is stronger strategically than Nash equilibrium, assuming everyone participates only once. In that case, it’s a dominant strategy to be honest, rather than just a best response. If people participate multiple times, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is harder to characterize. See Gao et al (2013)] for the best current description, which roughly says you shouldn’t reveal any information until the very last moment. The paper has an overview of the LMSR for anyone interested.
Thanks for the link to Gao et al. It looks like the general problem is still unsolved, would be interesting to figure it out...