I think most of the incompatible beliefs people come up with are not directly from people’s own experiences, but rather from Aumann-agreeing with other members of the ideologies who push those ideas.
It’s trust rather than trust in rationality. There’s very strong evidence that people get most of their beliefs from their social background, but explicitly irrational ideologoies operate the same way, so there’s little evidence that social trust is an Aumann mechanism.
Rationality has this thing where it does ignore the “boilerplate”, the annoying details, in multiple cases. That leads to making claims that are too broad—or diluting the meanings of terms: it;’s often hard to say which. Bayesian probability is treated as some kind of probablistic reasoning, not necessarily qualitative; Aumann’s theroem just means reasonable people should agree, etc.
It’s trust rather than trust in rationality. There’s very strong evidence that people get most of their beliefs from their social background, but explicitly irrational ideologoies operate the same way, so there’s little evidence that social trust is an Aumann mechanism.
Rationality has this thing where it does ignore the “boilerplate”, the annoying details, in multiple cases. That leads to making claims that are too broad—or diluting the meanings of terms: it;’s often hard to say which. Bayesian probability is treated as some kind of probablistic reasoning, not necessarily qualitative; Aumann’s theroem just means reasonable people should agree, etc.