The concept of intrinsic value has been characterized above in terms of the value that something has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” The custom has been not to distinguish between the meanings of these terms, but we will see that there is reason to think that there may in fact be more than one concept at issue here. For the moment, though, let us ignore this complication and focus on what it means to say that something is valuable for its own sake as opposed to being valuable for the sake of something else to which it is related in some way. Perhaps it is easiest to grasp this distinction by way of illustration.
Suppose that someone were to ask you whether it is good to help others in time of need. Unless you suspected some sort of trick, you would answer, “Yes, of course.” If this person were to go on to ask you why acting in this way is good, you might say that it is good to help others in time of need simply because it is good that their needs be satisfied. If you were then asked why it is good that people’s needs be satisfied, you might be puzzled. You might be inclined to say, “It just is.” Or you might accept the legitimacy of the question and say that it is good that people’s needs be satisfied because this brings them pleasure. But then, of course, your interlocutor could ask once again, “What’s good about that?” Perhaps at this point you would answer, “It just is good that people be pleased,” and thus put an end to this line of questioning. Or perhaps you would again seek to explain the fact that it is good that people be pleased in terms of something else that you take to be good. At some point, though, you would have to put an end to the questions, not because you would have grown tired of them (though that is a distinct possibility), but because you would be forced to recognize that, if one thing derives its goodness from some other thing, which derives its goodness from yet a third thing, and so on, there must come a point at which you reach something whose goodness is not derivative in this way, something that “just is” good in its own right, something whose goodness is the source of, and thus explains, the goodness to be found in all the other things that precede it on the list. It is at this point that you will have arrived at intrinsic goodness.[10] That which is intrinsically good is nonderivatively good; it is good for its own sake.
From discussions with you, I seem to recall that you at least value free access to information and other things associated with the Pirate ideology. Remember when I was talking about that business model for a hypothetical magazine that would summarize the content of basic university courses for everyone and offer an archive of past articles for subscribers? If I remember correctly, it was you who objected that the notion of restricting access behind a paywall felt wrong.
From discussions with you, I seem to recall that you at least value free access to information and other things associated with the Pirate ideology
I do value it in the meaning “I think that it’s really useful approximation for how society can protect itself and all people in it and make many people happy”. Why I care about making many people happy? I don’t, really. Making many people happy is kinda assumed to be the goal of societies, and out of general interest in optimizing stuff I like to attempt to figure out better ways for it to do that. Nothing beyond that. I don’t feel that this goal is any “better” than trying to make people as miserable as possible. Other than that I object to being miserable myself.
I don’t remember ever claiming something to be wrong as such, but only wrong assuming some values. Going against pirate-values because it’s better for magazine-keeper would be bad news for the “more optimal” pirate-society, because that society wouldn’t be stable.
edit: And based on that writing, my own well-being and not-unhappiness is the sole intrinsic value I have. I know evolution has hammered some reactions into my brain, like reflex-like bad feeling when I see others get hurt or something, but other than that brief feeling, I don’t really care.
Or, I wouldn’t care if my own well-being wouldn’t relate to others doing well or worse. But undestanding this requires conscious effort, and it’s quite different than what I thought values to be like.
In that case, your own well-being is probably your only intrinsic value. That’s far from unheard of: the amount of values people have varies. Some have lots, some only have one. Extremely depressed people might not have any at all.
Does this description of value help?
From discussions with you, I seem to recall that you at least value free access to information and other things associated with the Pirate ideology. Remember when I was talking about that business model for a hypothetical magazine that would summarize the content of basic university courses for everyone and offer an archive of past articles for subscribers? If I remember correctly, it was you who objected that the notion of restricting access behind a paywall felt wrong.
I do value it in the meaning “I think that it’s really useful approximation for how society can protect itself and all people in it and make many people happy”. Why I care about making many people happy? I don’t, really. Making many people happy is kinda assumed to be the goal of societies, and out of general interest in optimizing stuff I like to attempt to figure out better ways for it to do that. Nothing beyond that. I don’t feel that this goal is any “better” than trying to make people as miserable as possible. Other than that I object to being miserable myself.
I don’t remember ever claiming something to be wrong as such, but only wrong assuming some values. Going against pirate-values because it’s better for magazine-keeper would be bad news for the “more optimal” pirate-society, because that society wouldn’t be stable.
edit: And based on that writing, my own well-being and not-unhappiness is the sole intrinsic value I have. I know evolution has hammered some reactions into my brain, like reflex-like bad feeling when I see others get hurt or something, but other than that brief feeling, I don’t really care.
Or, I wouldn’t care if my own well-being wouldn’t relate to others doing well or worse. But undestanding this requires conscious effort, and it’s quite different than what I thought values to be like.
Interesting.
In that case, your own well-being is probably your only intrinsic value. That’s far from unheard of: the amount of values people have varies. Some have lots, some only have one. Extremely depressed people might not have any at all.