I think CDT ultimately has to grapple with the question as well, because physics is math, and so physical counterfactuals are ultimately mathematical counterfactuals.
“Physics is math” is ontologically reductive.
Physics can often be specified as a dynamical system (along with interpretations of e.g. what high-level entities it represents, how it gets observed). Dynamical systems can be specified mathematically. Dynamical systems also have causal counterfactuals (what if you suddenly changed the system state to be this instead?).
Causal counterfactuals defined this way have problems (violation of physical law has consequences). But they are well-defined.
Yeah, agreed, I no longer endorse the argument I was making there—one has to say more than “physics is math” to establish the importance of dealing with logical counterfactuals.
“Physics is math” is ontologically reductive.
Physics can often be specified as a dynamical system (along with interpretations of e.g. what high-level entities it represents, how it gets observed). Dynamical systems can be specified mathematically. Dynamical systems also have causal counterfactuals (what if you suddenly changed the system state to be this instead?).
Causal counterfactuals defined this way have problems (violation of physical law has consequences). But they are well-defined.
Yeah, agreed, I no longer endorse the argument I was making there—one has to say more than “physics is math” to establish the importance of dealing with logical counterfactuals.