I think “Why The West Rules”, by Ian Morris, has a pretty informative take on this. The impression I got from the book was that gradually accruing technologies/knowledge, like the stuff you mention, is slowly accruing in the background amid the ups and downs of history, and during each peak of civilizational complexity (most notably the Roman empire, and the medieval-era Song Dynasty in china, and then industrial-era Britain) humanity basically gets another shot-on-goal to potentially industrialize.
Britain had a couple of lucky breaks—cheap and abundant coal, but also the way that the industrial revolution was preceded by the growth-boosting effects of transatlantic contact. (For instance getting all kinds of new foods from the New World, like potatoes, which then boost agricultural output across Europe. And the ways that putting on big risky trans-oceanic expeditions incentivized the development of corporate structures / capitalism / etc. And just having a century of positive-sum growth puts everyone in a good frame of mind in terms of being motivated and risk-tolerant and seeking opportunities, rather than there being tons of conflict.)
So, in that sense, maybe the industrial revolution “came early” due to these lucky breaks, and otherwise would have been delayed for another century until, say, Germany or the USA started digging up coal (or oil, or some other energy source) even if Britain didn’t have any.
Unrelated: fellow fans of Morris’s book might appreciate my parody blog post “Why The East Rules—For Now”.
I think “Why The West Rules”, by Ian Morris, has a pretty informative take on this. The impression I got from the book was that gradually accruing technologies/knowledge, like the stuff you mention, is slowly accruing in the background amid the ups and downs of history, and during each peak of civilizational complexity (most notably the Roman empire, and the medieval-era Song Dynasty in china, and then industrial-era Britain) humanity basically gets another shot-on-goal to potentially industrialize.
Britain had a couple of lucky breaks—cheap and abundant coal, but also the way that the industrial revolution was preceded by the growth-boosting effects of transatlantic contact. (For instance getting all kinds of new foods from the New World, like potatoes, which then boost agricultural output across Europe. And the ways that putting on big risky trans-oceanic expeditions incentivized the development of corporate structures / capitalism / etc. And just having a century of positive-sum growth puts everyone in a good frame of mind in terms of being motivated and risk-tolerant and seeking opportunities, rather than there being tons of conflict.)
So, in that sense, maybe the industrial revolution “came early” due to these lucky breaks, and otherwise would have been delayed for another century until, say, Germany or the USA started digging up coal (or oil, or some other energy source) even if Britain didn’t have any.
Unrelated: fellow fans of Morris’s book might appreciate my parody blog post “Why The East Rules—For Now”.