That the fact that I am in special position should rise my estimation that I am in simulation. And that any AI would have (as instrumental goal) creation of millions of simulations to solve numerically Fermi paradox by modeling different civilizations near the time of global risks and to model different AI-goal systems near AI creation time.
But now I will try different type of reasoning which may be used against such logic. Let’s consider following example: “Given that my name is Alex, what is the probability that my name is Alex?” Of course, 1.
Given that I am interested in AI, what is the probability that I know about simulation argument? Its high, almost 1. And given that I know about simulation argument, what is the probability that I think that I am in simulation—it is also high. So it is not surprising that I estimate it high, if i am already in this field.
The core of this objection is that not only you are special, but that everybody is special, yet in their own believe system. Like “Given that I believe in God Zeus, it makes Zeus more likely to be real”. Because we have many people, and everybody think that their believe system is special, so there is nothing special in any believe system.
I am not sure that this line of reasoning cancels our conclusion that we may be inside simulation.
Also the question arises of what to derive from the result ‘I am likely living in a simulation’ esp. the ‘likely’ part. After all some people making these inferences may still be wrong.
The only predictive thing is that miracles in the simulations are more probable. But not guaranteed.
It also means that you are more likely to experience improbable events in the future.
If I am part of AI safety crowd, and live in simulation, it is more likely that I will actually participate in programming first AI.
I guess an answer to “Given that my name is Alex, what is the probability that my name is Alex?” could be that the hypothesis is highly selected. When you’re still the soul that’ll be assigned to a body, looking at the world from above, this guy named Alex won’t stick out because of his name. But the people who will influence the most consequential event in the history of that world will.
I think that where are many domains where people think that they are “will influence the most consequential event in the history of that world”.
So the write question is what is the probability that a random person interested in changing the world think that he is able to participate in it. Almost 1.
“The core of this objection is that not only you are special, but that everybody is special”
Is your point sort of the same thing I’m saying with this? “Everyone has some things in their life that are very exceptional by pure chance. I’m sure there’s some way to deal with this in statistics but I don’t know it.”
I agree this the main premises of this text.
That the fact that I am in special position should rise my estimation that I am in simulation. And that any AI would have (as instrumental goal) creation of millions of simulations to solve numerically Fermi paradox by modeling different civilizations near the time of global risks and to model different AI-goal systems near AI creation time.
But now I will try different type of reasoning which may be used against such logic. Let’s consider following example: “Given that my name is Alex, what is the probability that my name is Alex?” Of course, 1.
Given that I am interested in AI, what is the probability that I know about simulation argument? Its high, almost 1. And given that I know about simulation argument, what is the probability that I think that I am in simulation—it is also high. So it is not surprising that I estimate it high, if i am already in this field.
The core of this objection is that not only you are special, but that everybody is special, yet in their own believe system. Like “Given that I believe in God Zeus, it makes Zeus more likely to be real”. Because we have many people, and everybody think that their believe system is special, so there is nothing special in any believe system.
I am not sure that this line of reasoning cancels our conclusion that we may be inside simulation.
Also the question arises of what to derive from the result ‘I am likely living in a simulation’ esp. the ‘likely’ part. After all some people making these inferences may still be wrong.
The only predictive thing is that miracles in the simulations are more probable. But not guaranteed. It also means that you are more likely to experience improbable events in the future.
If I am part of AI safety crowd, and live in simulation, it is more likely that I will actually participate in programming first AI.
There are many different types of possible simulations. Me, as usual, have created map of simulations. It is here: “Simulations Map: what is the most probable type of the simulation in which we live?” http://lesswrong.com/lw/mv0/simulations_map_what_is_the_most_probable_type_of/
I guess an answer to “Given that my name is Alex, what is the probability that my name is Alex?” could be that the hypothesis is highly selected. When you’re still the soul that’ll be assigned to a body, looking at the world from above, this guy named Alex won’t stick out because of his name. But the people who will influence the most consequential event in the history of that world will.
I think that where are many domains where people think that they are “will influence the most consequential event in the history of that world”. So the write question is what is the probability that a random person interested in changing the world think that he is able to participate in it. Almost 1.
“The core of this objection is that not only you are special, but that everybody is special”
Is your point sort of the same thing I’m saying with this? “Everyone has some things in their life that are very exceptional by pure chance. I’m sure there’s some way to deal with this in statistics but I don’t know it.”
Yes, I meant the same. But the fact that we near AI crowd could overweight that bias.