This article seems like it was not written for LessWrong? It explores how we need to do conscious thinking, how we need to suggest and evaluate choices using our emotions, and essentially rephrases part of Sequences while reverting to pre-LW terminology, for “rationality” in particular.
And on top of that, “superrationality” concept is described unsoundly:
Different choices are impossible …
then if a dilemma requires two players to choose different ways at risk of losing (e.g. colliding on road, or booking one conference room at the same time), the text implies there would be no valid choice. In fact we know that there are randomized strategies, and that there often are distinctors useful for decision making.
I think you’re misunderstanding a key point presented in the writing. Optimal coordination is not indicating that everyone makes identical choices. X != Y. The text is not implying that there would be no valid choice. The text is implying that the optimal choice is the one in which the assumption is made that the underlying system is the same, and the information is different in different locations. I definitely see how “choice” is used as both referring to the function of how to choose and the outcome in my writing, and that should’ve been made clearer.
We share common emotional and cognitive processing capabilities, but we operate with different information and perspectives and needs. Randomized strategies are only optimal in cases where further information processing cannot be performed. Thus, when colliding on a road, the optimal choice would be one in which both players are able to internalize their own need to pick opposing (cooperative) actions when in a situation that requires it, and pick similar (cooperative) actions when in a situation that requires it.
Definitely, I’m working on it. Lots of writing that needs to be done. The novelty here is actually that I would propose we can use this framework to make novel, testable predictions about neurology from subjective experiencing, but that’s an extremely big and speculative claim, so it needs a bit of scaffolding. The main barrier to entry right now is definitely my lack of practical/concrete examples, so I’ll be focusing on that next.
This article seems like it was not written for LessWrong? It explores how we need to do conscious thinking, how we need to suggest and evaluate choices using our emotions, and essentially rephrases part of Sequences while reverting to pre-LW terminology, for “rationality” in particular.
And on top of that, “superrationality” concept is described unsoundly:
then if a dilemma requires two players to choose different ways at risk of losing (e.g. colliding on road, or booking one conference room at the same time), the text implies there would be no valid choice. In fact we know that there are randomized strategies, and that there often are distinctors useful for decision making.
I think you’re misunderstanding a key point presented in the writing. Optimal coordination is not indicating that everyone makes identical choices. X != Y. The text is not implying that there would be no valid choice. The text is implying that the optimal choice is the one in which the assumption is made that the underlying system is the same, and the information is different in different locations. I definitely see how “choice” is used as both referring to the function of how to choose and the outcome in my writing, and that should’ve been made clearer.
We share common emotional and cognitive processing capabilities, but we operate with different information and perspectives and needs. Randomized strategies are only optimal in cases where further information processing cannot be performed. Thus, when colliding on a road, the optimal choice would be one in which both players are able to internalize their own need to pick opposing (cooperative) actions when in a situation that requires it, and pick similar (cooperative) actions when in a situation that requires it.
Well I’d really love to see a practical example because for now the text clicks as “yes, that’s how it should be, indeed, and what’s novel here?”. (By the way it seems you haven’t yet started at how the gains would be divided; that seems relevant for continuing, and is already described in https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vJ7ggyjuP4u2yHNcP/threat-resistant-bargaining-megapost-introducing-the-rose.)
Definitely, I’m working on it. Lots of writing that needs to be done. The novelty here is actually that I would propose we can use this framework to make novel, testable predictions about neurology from subjective experiencing, but that’s an extremely big and speculative claim, so it needs a bit of scaffolding. The main barrier to entry right now is definitely my lack of practical/concrete examples, so I’ll be focusing on that next.