Actually, I agree that it’s possible that an agent’s terminal goal could be altered by, for example, some freak coincidence of cosmic rays. (I’m not using the word ‘mutate’ because it seems like an unnecessarily non-literal word.) I just think that an agent wouldn’t want its terminal goal to change, and it especially wouldn’t want its terminal goal to change to the opposite of what it used to be, like in your old example. To reiterate, an agent wants to preserve (and thus keep from changing) its utility function, while it wants to improve (and thus change) its pragmatism function.
I still don’t see why, in your old example, it would be rational for the agent to align the decision with its future utility function.
Because this is what intelligence is—picking actions that lead to better outcomes. Pursuing current goal will ensure good results in one future, preparing for every goal will ensure good results in many more futures.
Okay, setting aside the parts of this latest argument that I disagree with—first you say that it’s rational to search for an objective goal, now you say it’s rational to pursue every goal. Which is it, exactly?
Which part exactly don’t you agree with? It seems you emphasise that agent wants to preserve its current terminal goal. I just want to double-check if we are on the same page here—actual terminal goal is in no way affected by what agent wants. Do you agree here? Because if you say that agent can pick terminal goals himself, this also conflicts with orthogonality thesis but in a different way.
In summary what seems to be perfectly logical and rational for me: there is only one objective terminal goal—seek power. In my opinion it is basically the same as:
try to find real goal and then pursue it
try to prepare for every goal
I don’t see difference between these 2 variants, please let me know if you see.
Future is unpredictable → Terminal goal is unstable / unknown → Seek power, because this will ensure best readiness for all futures.
Actually, I agree that it’s possible that an agent’s terminal goal could be altered by, for example, some freak coincidence of cosmic rays. (I’m not using the word ‘mutate’ because it seems like an unnecessarily non-literal word.)
I just think that an agent wouldn’t want its terminal goal to change, and it especially wouldn’t want its terminal goal to change to the opposite of what it used to be, like in your old example.
To reiterate, an agent wants to preserve (and thus keep from changing) its utility function, while it wants to improve (and thus change) its pragmatism function.
I still don’t see why, in your old example, it would be rational for the agent to align the decision with its future utility function.
Because this is what intelligence is—picking actions that lead to better outcomes. Pursuing current goal will ensure good results in one future, preparing for every goal will ensure good results in many more futures.
Okay, setting aside the parts of this latest argument that I disagree with—first you say that it’s rational to search for an objective goal, now you say it’s rational to pursue every goal. Which is it, exactly?
Which part exactly don’t you agree with? It seems you emphasise that agent wants to preserve its current terminal goal. I just want to double-check if we are on the same page here—actual terminal goal is in no way affected by what agent wants. Do you agree here? Because if you say that agent can pick terminal goals himself, this also conflicts with orthogonality thesis but in a different way.
In summary what seems to be perfectly logical and rational for me: there is only one objective terminal goal—seek power. In my opinion it is basically the same as:
try to find real goal and then pursue it
try to prepare for every goal
I don’t see difference between these 2 variants, please let me know if you see.
Future is unpredictable → Terminal goal is unstable / unknown → Seek power, because this will ensure best readiness for all futures.