And, the world-perception ontology has conscious experience as a component. For, how else can what were originally perceptual patterns be explained, except by positing that there is a camera-like entity in the world (attached to some physical body) that generates such percepts?
You are implicitly explaining only one aspect or definition of consciousness: the existence of a subjective point of view. Other aspects such as high order thought or qualua are not dealt with.
Although you use the term “ontology” you are not attempting to explain what is ultimately real… both pattern ontology and object ontology as you describe them are phenomenological, from the perspective of the subject. A realist could still object that consciousness hasn’t been shown to feature in the basic ontology.
Agree regarding high order thought, but “qualia” seems to mean the contents of the subjective point of view? Based on SEP article. “There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives.”
I agree with this. I do think a materialist should be sympathetic to naturalized epistemology which includes developmental psychology as a source of information on what a human could possibly workably consider to be real (and, what they “actually consider to be real” in a psychological sense).
Agree regarding high order thought, but “qualia” seems to mean the contents of the subjective point of view? Based on SEP article. “There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives.”
I don’t see if that is agreeing with my point or not.
You are implicitly explaining only one aspect or definition of consciousness: the existence of a subjective point of view. Other aspects such as high order thought or qualua are not dealt with.
Although you use the term “ontology” you are not attempting to explain what is ultimately real… both pattern ontology and object ontology as you describe them are phenomenological, from the perspective of the subject. A realist could still object that consciousness hasn’t been shown to feature in the basic ontology.
Agree regarding high order thought, but “qualia” seems to mean the contents of the subjective point of view? Based on SEP article. “There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives.”
I agree with this. I do think a materialist should be sympathetic to naturalized epistemology which includes developmental psychology as a source of information on what a human could possibly workably consider to be real (and, what they “actually consider to be real” in a psychological sense).
I don’t see if that is agreeing with my point or not.