You probably don’t care about how it seems to me; you care about how it is.
Indeed, and as I argued above, a person who reliably tracks the distinction between what-is and what-seems-to-them tells me more about what-is than a person who doesn’t.
I mean, I suppose that if someone happened to know that the dress was blue, and told me “the dress looks white to me” without saying ”...but it’s actually blue”, that would be misleading on the subject of the color of the dress. But I think less misleading, and a less common failure mode, than a person who doesn’t know that the dress is blue, who tells me “the dress is white” because that’s how it looks to them.
I mean, in the specific case of the colors of objects in photographs, I think correspondence between what-is and what-seems is sufficiently high not to worry about it most of the time. The dress was famous in part because it’s unusual. If you know that different people see the dress as different colors, and you don’t know what’s going on, then (according to me and, I claim, according to sensible rationalist discourse norms) you should say “it looks white to me” rather than “it’s white”. But if you have no reason to think there’s anything unusual about this particular photograph of a dress that looks white to you, then whatever.
But I think this correspondence is significantly lower between “X was stupid” and “X seemed stupid”. And so in this case, it seems to me that being careful to make the distinction:
Makes you better at saying true things;
Increases the information content of your words, on both the subjects what-is and what-seems-to-you;
Hm, I think I’m maybe somewhat equivocating between “the dress looks blue to me” as a statement about my state of mind and as a statement about the dress.
Like I think this distinction could be unpacked and it would be fine, I’d still endorse what I’m getting at above. But I haven’t unpacked it as much as would be good.
Indeed, and as I argued above, a person who reliably tracks the distinction between what-is and what-seems-to-them tells me more about what-is than a person who doesn’t.
I mean, I suppose that if someone happened to know that the dress was blue, and told me “the dress looks white to me” without saying ”...but it’s actually blue”, that would be misleading on the subject of the color of the dress. But I think less misleading, and a less common failure mode, than a person who doesn’t know that the dress is blue, who tells me “the dress is white” because that’s how it looks to them.
I mean, in the specific case of the colors of objects in photographs, I think correspondence between what-is and what-seems is sufficiently high not to worry about it most of the time. The dress was famous in part because it’s unusual. If you know that different people see the dress as different colors, and you don’t know what’s going on, then (according to me and, I claim, according to sensible rationalist discourse norms) you should say “it looks white to me” rather than “it’s white”. But if you have no reason to think there’s anything unusual about this particular photograph of a dress that looks white to you, then whatever.
But I think this correspondence is significantly lower between “X was stupid” and “X seemed stupid”. And so in this case, it seems to me that being careful to make the distinction:
Makes you better at saying true things;
Increases the information content of your words, on both the subjects what-is and what-seems-to-you;
Is kinder to authors.
Hm, I think I’m maybe somewhat equivocating between “the dress looks blue to me” as a statement about my state of mind and as a statement about the dress.
Like I think this distinction could be unpacked and it would be fine, I’d still endorse what I’m getting at above. But I haven’t unpacked it as much as would be good.