The real question is how mechanistic matter can create subjective experience.
Philosophy (which today is mostly a historical field—the study of old speculations) is not the right place to find the answer to this question. Computational neuroscience is.
Rather, it only poses problems for those who say that brain states are the same thing as conscious experience.
The ‘problem’ is overstated—the mindstate of observing green through information flowing from the retina through multiple layers of visual cortical processing is in a wholly different category than the congenital colorblind’s mindstate of thinking about green as an abstract linguistic concept.
The two mindstates are completely different and involve largely unrelated computations in functionally distinct minds.
Philosophy (which today is mostly a historical field—the study of old speculations) is not the right place to find the answer to this question. Computational neuroscience is.
The ‘problem’ is overstated—the mindstate of observing green through information flowing from the retina through multiple layers of visual cortical processing is in a wholly different category than the congenital colorblind’s mindstate of thinking about green as an abstract linguistic concept.
The two mindstates are completely different and involve largely unrelated computations in functionally distinct minds.