I can’t but agree with all you have written, but I have the feeling that we are now discussing a question slightly different from the original one: “how the point of morality is rules?” People indeed don’t behave as if they literally care nothing for consequences to other people’s well being, but many people behave as if, in certain situations, the consequences are less important than the rules. Often it is possible to persuade them to accept the consequentialist viewpoint by abstract argument—more often than it is possible to convert a consequentialist to deontology by abstract argument—but that only shows consequentialism is more consistent with abstract thinking. But there are situations, like the Trolley Problem, where even many the self-identified consequentialists choose to prefer rules over consequences, even if it necessitates heavy rationalisation and/or fighting the hypothetical.
It seems natural to conclude that for many people, although the rules aren’t the point of morality, they are certainly one of the points and stand independently of another point, which are the consequences. Perhaps it isn’t a helpful answer if you want to understand, on the level of gut feelings, how the rules can trump solid consequentialist reasoning even in absence of uncertainty and bias, if your own deontologist intuitions are very weak. But at least it should be clear that the answer to the question you have asked in your topmost comment,
[if the point of morality is rules] why are the rules not completely random?
has something to do with our evolved intuitions. And even if you disagree with that, I hope you agree that whatever the answer is, it would not change much if in the conditional we replace “rules” by “consequences”.
It seems natural to conclude that for many people, although the rules aren’t the point of morality, they are certainly one of the points and stand independently of another point, which are the consequences.
I agree with you there. But even though people seem to care about both rules and consequences, as separate categories in their mental conceptions of morality, it does seem as if the rules have a recurring pattern of bringing about or preventing certain particular consequences. Our evolved instincts make us prone to following certain rules, and they make us prone to desiring certain outcomes. Many of us think the rules should trump the desired outcomes—but the rules themselves line up with desired outcomes most of the time. Moral dilemmas are just descriptions of those rare situations when following the rule won’t lead to the desired outcome.
I can’t but agree with all you have written, but I have the feeling that we are now discussing a question slightly different from the original one: “how the point of morality is rules?” People indeed don’t behave as if they literally care nothing for consequences to other people’s well being, but many people behave as if, in certain situations, the consequences are less important than the rules. Often it is possible to persuade them to accept the consequentialist viewpoint by abstract argument—more often than it is possible to convert a consequentialist to deontology by abstract argument—but that only shows consequentialism is more consistent with abstract thinking. But there are situations, like the Trolley Problem, where even many the self-identified consequentialists choose to prefer rules over consequences, even if it necessitates heavy rationalisation and/or fighting the hypothetical.
It seems natural to conclude that for many people, although the rules aren’t the point of morality, they are certainly one of the points and stand independently of another point, which are the consequences. Perhaps it isn’t a helpful answer if you want to understand, on the level of gut feelings, how the rules can trump solid consequentialist reasoning even in absence of uncertainty and bias, if your own deontologist intuitions are very weak. But at least it should be clear that the answer to the question you have asked in your topmost comment,
has something to do with our evolved intuitions. And even if you disagree with that, I hope you agree that whatever the answer is, it would not change much if in the conditional we replace “rules” by “consequences”.
I agree with you there. But even though people seem to care about both rules and consequences, as separate categories in their mental conceptions of morality, it does seem as if the rules have a recurring pattern of bringing about or preventing certain particular consequences. Our evolved instincts make us prone to following certain rules, and they make us prone to desiring certain outcomes. Many of us think the rules should trump the desired outcomes—but the rules themselves line up with desired outcomes most of the time. Moral dilemmas are just descriptions of those rare situations when following the rule won’t lead to the desired outcome.