Wait, are you asserting that sexism is ever justified? If so, we have a definition mismatch.
For a start, we have Forbes Magazine drawing a link from EP to why most women will never be CEOs (Never mind that most people will never be CEOs). I haven’t yet demonstrated how many readers of Forbes allowed the claim that EP justifies the sexist treatment of executives, and also take sexist actions regarding executives; will you accept that 5% of board members of publicly traded companies make sexist decisions about executives, and that 80% of those people read Forbes and didn’t object to that (4% of board members overall)? (again, I’m using numbers that I think are conservative, because direct measurements are hard.)
Sexist actions, by definition, has no valid justification. If there was a valid justification, they would be rational actions.
Going from “Females, in general, make poor executives” (even if this were to be true) to “A particular female will make a poor executive” Isn’t a valid justification. I’m going to make the dangerous claim that the proof is obvious and trivial.
What about going from “members of subcategory X of category Y are more likely to possess characteristic C” to “In the absence of further information, a particular member of subcategory X is more likely to possess characteristic C than a non-X member of category Y”.
You are saying you can’t go from probabilistic information to certainty. This is a strawman.
That only applies if there is an absence of further information. Do you make judgments about what the weather is right now by looking only at historical information, or do you look out the window?
Also, if you’re going to get into category theory:
members of subcategory X of category Y are more likely to possess characteristic C
Category A is a subset of category X
Category B is mutually exclusive with category X, but a subset of Y
Category B is smaller than category A
Given only “members of subcategory X of category Y are more likely to possess characteristic C”, can you draw a conclusion about whether a random member of category A or category B is more likely to possess characteristic C?
Let characteristic C be “will perform above the 75th percentile of CEOs”, category X be ‘males’, category A be ‘males who being seriously considered for a CEO position’, and category B be ‘females and intersex people being considered for a CEO position’.
It’s only a strawman if it isn’t the exact argument being used in the boardroom.
Wait, are you asserting that sexism is ever justified? If so, we have a definition mismatch.
For a start, we have Forbes Magazine drawing a link from EP to why most women will never be CEOs (Never mind that most people will never be CEOs). I haven’t yet demonstrated how many readers of Forbes allowed the claim that EP justifies the sexist treatment of executives, and also take sexist actions regarding executives; will you accept that 5% of board members of publicly traded companies make sexist decisions about executives, and that 80% of those people read Forbes and didn’t object to that (4% of board members overall)? (again, I’m using numbers that I think are conservative, because direct measurements are hard.)
Since I specified unjustified sexism, you’ll have to provide an argument for why said justification is incorrect.
Sexist actions, by definition, has no valid justification. If there was a valid justification, they would be rational actions.
Going from “Females, in general, make poor executives” (even if this were to be true) to “A particular female will make a poor executive” Isn’t a valid justification. I’m going to make the dangerous claim that the proof is obvious and trivial.
What about going from “members of subcategory X of category Y are more likely to possess characteristic C” to “In the absence of further information, a particular member of subcategory X is more likely to possess characteristic C than a non-X member of category Y”.
You are saying you can’t go from probabilistic information to certainty. This is a strawman.
That only applies if there is an absence of further information. Do you make judgments about what the weather is right now by looking only at historical information, or do you look out the window?
Also, if you’re going to get into category theory:
members of subcategory X of category Y are more likely to possess characteristic C
Category A is a subset of category X Category B is mutually exclusive with category X, but a subset of Y Category B is smaller than category A Given only “members of subcategory X of category Y are more likely to possess characteristic C”, can you draw a conclusion about whether a random member of category A or category B is more likely to possess characteristic C?
Let characteristic C be “will perform above the 75th percentile of CEOs”, category X be ‘males’, category A be ‘males who being seriously considered for a CEO position’, and category B be ‘females and intersex people being considered for a CEO position’.
It’s only a strawman if it isn’t the exact argument being used in the boardroom.
Sounds good to me if you’re going to get all connotative about it.
Was that sour grapes with an ad-hom, genuine agreement with a condition, sarcasm, or something else? I honestly can’t tell.
Genuine agreement with whimsical annoyance about having to consider actual situations and connotations.
Thank you for the clarification.