Whether something is a science is not decided by how many sciency-looking accoutrements and trappings it has.
Well, certainly not, but having sciency-looking accoutrements and trappings is nevertheless bayesian evidence that something is a science. The question is just how good that evidence is. You’re saying, I take it, that your prior probability that a given set of claims will come along with trappings equivalent to evo psych (or whatever) is substantially higher than your prior probability that evo psych is a science. But in any case, the trappings should probably produce a skyward update (even if it’s small).
having sciency-looking accoutrements and trappings is nevertheless bayesian evidence that something is a science. The question is just how good that evidence is.
No, not at all. The question isn’t how good that evidence is, the question is what other evidence is there. And in this particular case we have, for example, the lack of theories which can be falsified.
I would have no problems with calling evopsy, say, a field of study. But saying it’s a science implies rigor and tests against reality which are, um, absent.
Well, certainly not, but having sciency-looking accoutrements and trappings is nevertheless bayesian evidence that something is a science. The question is just how good that evidence is. You’re saying, I take it, that your prior probability that a given set of claims will come along with trappings equivalent to evo psych (or whatever) is substantially higher than your prior probability that evo psych is a science. But in any case, the trappings should probably produce a skyward update (even if it’s small).
No, not at all. The question isn’t how good that evidence is, the question is what other evidence is there. And in this particular case we have, for example, the lack of theories which can be falsified.
I would have no problems with calling evopsy, say, a field of study. But saying it’s a science implies rigor and tests against reality which are, um, absent.