A particular preference that does not make sense at all is empirically unlikely to exist due to the natural selection process. We should thus, if for whatever reason we prefer correspondence between map and territory, assign reasonable probability that most preferences will “make sense”.
As for why it should, well… I’m not able to conceive of an acceptable answer to that without first tabooing “should” and applying generous amounts of reductionism, recursively within sub-meanings and subspaces within semanticspace.
A particular preference that does not make sense at all is empirically unlikely to exist due to the natural selection process. We should thus, if for whatever reason we prefer correspondence between map and territory, assign reasonable probability that most preferences will “make sense”.
As for why it should, well… I’m not able to conceive of an acceptable answer to that without first tabooing “should” and applying generous amounts of reductionism, recursively within sub-meanings and subspaces within semanticspace.