There’s a lot of ways to act on data about group differences in intelligence.
For example, if it turns out that group A has a higher average IQ than group B, and that A and B can be distinguished reliably by genetic testing (including but not limited to visual inspection for associated phenotypes), I might decide to devote more effort to educating group B than group A, to make up for the difference. Or I might decide to devote more effort to educating group A than group B, to get the best bang for my education buck. Or I might decide to research the differences, to learn more about the physiological mechanisms of intelligence. Or I might change my ways of evaluating claims so that I give more weight to group A’s ideas relative to group B’s than I used to (assuming I used to believe they were equally intelligent). Or I might decide to structure my society in such a way that group A has access to certain privileges that group B is denied, on the grounds of their superiority, or such that B gets privileges A is denied, on the grounds of their greater need. Etc.
Which of those I do, if any, depends a lot on what I think follows from greater potential intelligence within a group. People disagree about this. People often change their minds about this depending on whether they consider themselves in group A or B.
Incidentally, just for the record: I find it pretty likely that there do exist such group differences, though I expect that the portion of variation in real-world expressed intelligence accounted for by group differences in innate intelligence is <10%. I find it fairly unlikely that “race” is the best detectable correlate of membership in such groups available to us, though it might be more reliable than, say, the shape of an individual’s head (also a popular theory once). I expect its popularity in that role is more of a reflection of historical social relations than a conclusion drawn from current data.
For example, if it turns out that group A has a higher average IQ than group B, and that A and B can be distinguished reliably by genetic testing (including but not limited to visual inspection for associated phenotypes), I might decide to devote more effort to educating group B than group A, to make up for the difference. Or I might decide to devote more effort to educating group A than group B, to get the best bang for my education buck.
Fair enough, that’s an example of policy, based on this data.
Or I might decide to research the differences, to learn more about the physiological mechanisms of intelligence.
Also cool, seems obvious in hindsight!
Or I might change my ways of evaluating claims so that I give more weight to group A’s ideas relative to group B’s than I used to (assuming I used to believe they were equally intelligent).
I’d imagine a group’s ideas are more to do with non-genetic factors than genetic intelligence.
Or I might decide to structure my society in such a way that group A has access to certain privileges that group B is denied, on the grounds of their superiority, or such that B gets privileges A is denied, on the grounds of their greater need. Etc.
For me some of these would be contingent on the additional discovery that the group’s intelligence is a result of its genetic difference; group B could be generally poorer, or less well-nourished, or some other factor leading to lower intelligence, in addition to being genetically distinguishable. This is also making the assumption that IQ tests are culturally fair and the like—though I’m happy to use the term as a placeholder for ‘idealized intelligence test’.
I’d imagine a group’s ideas are more to do with non-genetic factors than genetic intelligence.
As would I. But the claimant’s intelligence (whether genetic or otherwise) is nevertheless a factor I take into account when deciding how much weight to give a claim.
And, yes, all of this is contingent on the idea that IQ correlates well with intelligence.
And, yes, if it turns out that the physiological mechanisms whereby group A develops greater intelligence than group B are heavily environmentally mediated (e.g., due to differential poverty, nourishment, or other factors) I might well decide to alter the environment to increase intelligence in group B as well.
There’s a lot of ways to act on data about group differences in intelligence.
For example, if it turns out that group A has a higher average IQ than group B, and that A and B can be distinguished reliably by genetic testing (including but not limited to visual inspection for associated phenotypes), I might decide to devote more effort to educating group B than group A, to make up for the difference. Or I might decide to devote more effort to educating group A than group B, to get the best bang for my education buck. Or I might decide to research the differences, to learn more about the physiological mechanisms of intelligence. Or I might change my ways of evaluating claims so that I give more weight to group A’s ideas relative to group B’s than I used to (assuming I used to believe they were equally intelligent). Or I might decide to structure my society in such a way that group A has access to certain privileges that group B is denied, on the grounds of their superiority, or such that B gets privileges A is denied, on the grounds of their greater need. Etc.
Which of those I do, if any, depends a lot on what I think follows from greater potential intelligence within a group. People disagree about this. People often change their minds about this depending on whether they consider themselves in group A or B.
Incidentally, just for the record: I find it pretty likely that there do exist such group differences, though I expect that the portion of variation in real-world expressed intelligence accounted for by group differences in innate intelligence is <10%. I find it fairly unlikely that “race” is the best detectable correlate of membership in such groups available to us, though it might be more reliable than, say, the shape of an individual’s head (also a popular theory once). I expect its popularity in that role is more of a reflection of historical social relations than a conclusion drawn from current data.
Thanks for the reply!
Fair enough, that’s an example of policy, based on this data.
Also cool, seems obvious in hindsight!
I’d imagine a group’s ideas are more to do with non-genetic factors than genetic intelligence.
For me some of these would be contingent on the additional discovery that the group’s intelligence is a result of its genetic difference; group B could be generally poorer, or less well-nourished, or some other factor leading to lower intelligence, in addition to being genetically distinguishable. This is also making the assumption that IQ tests are culturally fair and the like—though I’m happy to use the term as a placeholder for ‘idealized intelligence test’.
As would I. But the claimant’s intelligence (whether genetic or otherwise) is nevertheless a factor I take into account when deciding how much weight to give a claim.
And, yes, all of this is contingent on the idea that IQ correlates well with intelligence.
And, yes, if it turns out that the physiological mechanisms whereby group A develops greater intelligence than group B are heavily environmentally mediated (e.g., due to differential poverty, nourishment, or other factors) I might well decide to alter the environment to increase intelligence in group B as well.