The way you are using it doesn’t necessarily imply real control, it may be imaginary control.
I’m discussing a hypothetical agent who believes itself to have control. So its beliefs include “I have free will”. Its belief isn’t “I believe that I have free will”.
It’s a “para-consistent material conditional” by which I mean the algorithm is limited in such a way as to prevent this explosion.
Yes, that makes sense.
However, were you flowing this all the way back in time?
Yes (see thread with Abram Demski).
What do you mean by dualistic?
Already factorized as an agent interacting with an environment.
Hmm, yeah this could be a viable theory. Anyway to summarise the argument I make in Is Backwards Causation Necessarily Absurd?, I point out that since physics is pretty much reversible, instead of A causing B, it seems as though we could also imagine B causing A and time going backwards. In this view, it would be reasonable to say that one-boxing (backwards-)caused the box to be full in Newcombs. I only sketched the theory because I don’t have enough physics knowledge to evaluate it. But the point is that we can give justification for a non-standard model of causality.
I’m discussing a hypothetical agent who believes itself to have control. So its beliefs include “I have free will”. Its belief isn’t “I believe that I have free will”.
Yes, that makes sense.
Yes (see thread with Abram Demski).
Already factorized as an agent interacting with an environment.
Hmm, yeah this could be a viable theory. Anyway to summarise the argument I make in Is Backwards Causation Necessarily Absurd?, I point out that since physics is pretty much reversible, instead of A causing B, it seems as though we could also imagine B causing A and time going backwards. In this view, it would be reasonable to say that one-boxing (backwards-)caused the box to be full in Newcombs. I only sketched the theory because I don’t have enough physics knowledge to evaluate it. But the point is that we can give justification for a non-standard model of causality.