As a side note—one thing I don’t understand is why more people don’t seem to want to use just the word “will” without the “free” part in front of it.
It seems like a much more straightforward and less fraught term, and something that we obviously have. Do we have a “will”? Obviously yes—we want things, we choose things, etc. Is that will “free”? Well what does that mean?
EDIT: I feel like this is a case of philosophers baking in a confusion into their standard term. It’d be like if instead of space we always talked about “absolute space”. And then post-Einstein people argued about whether “absolute space” existed or not, without ever just using the term “space” just by itself.
Philosophers talk about free will because it is contentious and therefore worth discussing philosophically , whereas will, qua wants and desires, isn’t.
cf, the silly physicists who insist on talking about dark matter, when anyone can see that ordinary matter exists.
Philosophers talk about free will because it is contentious and therefore worth discussing philosophically , whereas will, qua wants and desires, isn’t.
Fair point. But then why do so many (including philosophers) make statements like, “we seem to have free will”, or “this experience of apparent free will that we have requires explanation.”
If ‘free will’ in those statements means something different from ‘will’, then it seems like they’re assuming the (wrong) explanation.
cf, the silly physicists who insist on talking about dark matter, when anyone can see that ordinary matter exists.
If physicists often used the term “dark matter” in ways that suggested it’s the same thing as people’s folk concept of matter, then I’d agree that they were silly.
Fair point. But then why do so many (including philosophers) make statements like, “we seem to have free will”, or “this experience of apparent free will that we have requires explanation.”
Why specific philosophers say specific things is usually explained by the philosophers themselves, since it is hard to gain a reputation in the field by making unsupported assertions. But you seem to be making the point that is strange that any philosopher argues in favour of free will, since, according to you it is obviously non-existent. The answer to that is that you are not capable of reproducing all the arguments for or against a claim yourself, so your personal guesswork is not a good guide to how plausible something is.
“this experience of apparent free will that we have requires explanation.”
Doens’t everything require explanation? Even your man Yudkowsky offers an explanation of the feeling of free will.
If physicists often used the term “dark matter” in ways that suggested it’s the same thing as people’s folk concept of matter, then I’d agree that they were silly.
Physicists do use the word “matter” in a sense that departs from folk usage. For instance, they assert that it is mostly nothingness, and that it is equivalent to energy.
But you seem to be making the point that is strange that any philosopher argues in favour of free will, since, according to you it is obviously non-existent.
I didn’t mean that just the philosophers who believe in (libertarian, contra-causal) free will make statements like “we seem to have free will”, or “this experience of apparent free will that we have requires explanation”. I’ve heard those statements even from those questioning such free will.
They’ll say, “we seem to have free will, but actually it’s an illusion”.
What I do not see is proponents of determinism saying that “free will” is the wrong term, that most of the intuitive properties that our wants and choices seem to have are satisfied by the idea of a “will” plane and simple. And then starting the argument from there about whether there are additional properties that that will has or seems to have s.t. it’s reasonable to append the term “free” to the front.
Maybe it’s popularizers that I have to blame, rather than philosophers. I’m not sure. My complaint is that somehow the standard sides of the debate came to be labeled “free will” vs “determinism” rather than “uncaused will” vs “determined will”.
I think the “fee will” vs “determinism” framing unfairly makes it seem like whether any wanting or choosing is happening is at stake, such that people had to come up with the special term “compatibilism” for the position that “no no, there’s still wanting and choosing going on”.
If you started the debate with everyone agreeing, “obviously there’s some form of wanting and choosing happening,” and then asking, “but what form does it take and where does it come from? Can it be said to be caused by anything?” then I think the natural terms for the two camps would be something like “uncaused will” and “determined will”.
I think those terms accurately describe the major sides of the popular debate and are less likely to prejudice people’s intuitions in favor of the free/uncaused will side.
So what I don’t understand is: why don’t proponents of determinism push that framing?
Proponents of determinism tend to say that libertarian free will doesn’t exist, but compatibilist free will might. It is likely that they are expressing the same idea as you, but in different language.
As a side note—one thing I don’t understand is why more people don’t seem to want to use just the word “will” without the “free” part in front of it.
It seems like a much more straightforward and less fraught term, and something that we obviously have. Do we have a “will”? Obviously yes—we want things, we choose things, etc. Is that will “free”? Well what does that mean?
EDIT: I feel like this is a case of philosophers baking in a confusion into their standard term. It’d be like if instead of space we always talked about “absolute space”. And then post-Einstein people argued about whether “absolute space” existed or not, without ever just using the term “space” just by itself.
Philosophers talk about free will because it is contentious and therefore worth discussing philosophically , whereas will, qua wants and desires, isn’t.
cf, the silly physicists who insist on talking about dark matter, when anyone can see that ordinary matter exists.
Fair point. But then why do so many (including philosophers) make statements like, “we seem to have free will”, or “this experience of apparent free will that we have requires explanation.”
If ‘free will’ in those statements means something different from ‘will’, then it seems like they’re assuming the (wrong) explanation.
If physicists often used the term “dark matter” in ways that suggested it’s the same thing as people’s folk concept of matter, then I’d agree that they were silly.
Why specific philosophers say specific things is usually explained by the philosophers themselves, since it is hard to gain a reputation in the field by making unsupported assertions. But you seem to be making the point that is strange that any philosopher argues in favour of free will, since, according to you it is obviously non-existent. The answer to that is that you are not capable of reproducing all the arguments for or against a claim yourself, so your personal guesswork is not a good guide to how plausible something is.
Doens’t everything require explanation? Even your man Yudkowsky offers an explanation of the feeling of free will.
Physicists do use the word “matter” in a sense that departs from folk usage. For instance, they assert that it is mostly nothingness, and that it is equivalent to energy.
I didn’t mean that just the philosophers who believe in (libertarian, contra-causal) free will make statements like “we seem to have free will”, or “this experience of apparent free will that we have requires explanation”. I’ve heard those statements even from those questioning such free will.
They’ll say, “we seem to have free will, but actually it’s an illusion”.
What I do not see is proponents of determinism saying that “free will” is the wrong term, that most of the intuitive properties that our wants and choices seem to have are satisfied by the idea of a “will” plane and simple. And then starting the argument from there about whether there are additional properties that that will has or seems to have s.t. it’s reasonable to append the term “free” to the front.
Maybe it’s popularizers that I have to blame, rather than philosophers. I’m not sure. My complaint is that somehow the standard sides of the debate came to be labeled “free will” vs “determinism” rather than “uncaused will” vs “determined will”.
I think the “fee will” vs “determinism” framing unfairly makes it seem like whether any wanting or choosing is happening is at stake, such that people had to come up with the special term “compatibilism” for the position that “no no, there’s still wanting and choosing going on”.
If you started the debate with everyone agreeing, “obviously there’s some form of wanting and choosing happening,” and then asking, “but what form does it take and where does it come from? Can it be said to be caused by anything?” then I think the natural terms for the two camps would be something like “uncaused will” and “determined will”.
I think those terms accurately describe the major sides of the popular debate and are less likely to prejudice people’s intuitions in favor of the free/uncaused will side.
So what I don’t understand is: why don’t proponents of determinism push that framing?
Proponents of determinism tend to say that libertarian free will doesn’t exist, but compatibilist free will might. It is likely that they are expressing the same idea as you, but in different language.
That’s an interesting point