So, I would like to thank you guys for the hints and critical comments here—you are helping me a lot!
I’ll read what you recommended in order to investigate the epistemological properties of the degree-of-belief version of bayesianism. For now, I’m just full of doubts: “does bayesianism really stand as a normative theory of rational doxastic attitudes?”; “what is the relation between degrees of belief and evidential support?”, “is it correct to say that people reason in accordance to probability principles when they reason correctly?”, “is the idea of defeating evidence an ilusion?”, and still others.
=]
So, I would like to thank you guys for the hints and critical comments here—you are helping me a lot! I’ll read what you recommended in order to investigate the epistemological properties of the degree-of-belief version of bayesianism. For now, I’m just full of doubts: “does bayesianism really stand as a normative theory of rational doxastic attitudes?”; “what is the relation between degrees of belief and evidential support?”, “is it correct to say that people reason in accordance to probability principles when they reason correctly?”, “is the idea of defeating evidence an ilusion?”, and still others. =]