It seems I’ve given too little information to make it worth thinking on it. Here’s detailed explanation.
I’ll abbreviate thread of subjective experience as TSE.
If I make 10^6 copies of myself, then all 10^6+1 continuations of TSE are indistinguishable to external observer. Thus all these continuations are invariant under change of TSE, and it seems that we can assign equal probability to them. Yes, we can, but:
If TSE is not ontologically fundamental, then it is not bound by spacetime, laws of physics, universe, Everett multiverse, etc. There will be no logical contradiction, if you will find youself next instant as Boltzmann brain, or in one of infinitely many universes of level 4 multiverse, or outside your own lightcone. Thus:
Every finite set of continuations of TSE has zero probability. And finally:
We have no options, but Solomonoff prior to infer what we will experience next.
It seems I’ve given too little information to make it worth thinking on it. Here’s detailed explanation.
I’ll abbreviate thread of subjective experience as TSE.
If I make 10^6 copies of myself, then all 10^6+1 continuations of TSE are indistinguishable to external observer. Thus all these continuations are invariant under change of TSE, and it seems that we can assign equal probability to them. Yes, we can, but:
If TSE is not ontologically fundamental, then it is not bound by spacetime, laws of physics, universe, Everett multiverse, etc. There will be no logical contradiction, if you will find youself next instant as Boltzmann brain, or in one of infinitely many universes of level 4 multiverse, or outside your own lightcone. Thus:
Every finite set of continuations of TSE has zero probability. And finally:
We have no options, but Solomonoff prior to infer what we will experience next.