Not exactly. MIRI and others have research on logical uncertainty, which I would expect to eventually reduce the second premise to induction. I don’t think we have a clear plan yet showing how we’ll reach that level of practicality.
Justifying a not-super-exponentially-small prior probability for induction working feels like a category error. I guess we might get a kind of justification from better understanding Tegmark’s Mathematical Macrocosm hypothesis—or, more likely, understanding why it fails. Such an argument will probably lack the intuitive force of ‘Clearly the prior shouldn’t be that low.’
Not exactly. MIRI and others have research on logical uncertainty, which I would expect to eventually reduce the second premise to induction. I don’t think we have a clear plan yet showing how we’ll reach that level of practicality.
Justifying a not-super-exponentially-small prior probability for induction working feels like a category error. I guess we might get a kind of justification from better understanding Tegmark’s Mathematical Macrocosm hypothesis—or, more likely, understanding why it fails. Such an argument will probably lack the intuitive force of ‘Clearly the prior shouldn’t be that low.’