In either case, we might need to do some kind of outlier filtering: if e.g. literally every person on Earth is a user, then maybe some of them are utterly insane in ways that cause the Pareto frontier to collapse.
This seems near guaranteed to me: a non-zero amount of people will be that crazy (in our terms), so filtering will be necessary.
Then I’m curious about how we draw the line on outlier filtering. What filtering rule do we use? I don’t yet see a good principled rule (e.g. if we want to throw out people who’d collapse agreement to the disagreement point, there’s more than one way to do that).
Maybe crazy behaviour correlates with less intelligence
Depending what we mean by ‘crazy’ I think that’s unlikely—particularly when what we care about here are highly unusual moral stances. I’d see intelligence as a multiplier, rather than something which points you in the ‘right’ direction. Outliers will be at both extremes of intelligence—and I think you’ll get a much wider moral variety on the high end.
For instance, I don’t think you’ll find many low-intelligence antinatalists—and here I mean the stronger, non-obvious claim: not simply that most people calling themselves antinatalists, or advocating for antinatalism will have fairly high intelligence, but rather that most people with such a moral stance (perhaps not articulated) will have fairly high intelligence.
Generally, I think there are many weird moral stances you might think your way into that you’d be highly unlikely to find ‘naturally’ (through e.g. absorption of cultural norms). I’d also expect creativity to positively correlate with outlier moralities. Minds that habitually throw together seven disparate concepts will find crazier notions than those which don’t get beyond three.
First, I think we want to be thinking in terms of [personal morality we’d reflectively endorse] rather than [all the base, weird, conflicting… drivers of behaviour that happen to be in our heads].
There are things most of us would wish to change about ourselves if we could. There’s no sense in baking them in for all eternity (or bargaining on their behalf), just because they happen to form part of what drives us now. [though one does have to be a bit careful here, since it’s easy to miss the upside of qualities we regard as flaws]
With this in mind, reflectively endorsed antinatalism really is a problem: yes, some people will endorse sacrificing everything just to get to a world where there’s no suffering (because there are no people).
Note that the kinds of bargaining approach Vanessa is advocating are aimed at guaranteeing a lower bound for everyone (who’s not pre-filtered out) - so you only need to include one person with a particularly weird view to fail to reach a sensible bargain. [though her most recent version should avoid this]
This seems near guaranteed to me: a non-zero amount of people will be that crazy (in our terms), so filtering will be necessary.
Then I’m curious about how we draw the line on outlier filtering. What filtering rule do we use? I don’t yet see a good principled rule (e.g. if we want to throw out people who’d collapse agreement to the disagreement point, there’s more than one way to do that).
Depending what we mean by ‘crazy’ I think that’s unlikely—particularly when what we care about here are highly unusual moral stances. I’d see intelligence as a multiplier, rather than something which points you in the ‘right’ direction. Outliers will be at both extremes of intelligence—and I think you’ll get a much wider moral variety on the high end.
For instance, I don’t think you’ll find many low-intelligence antinatalists—and here I mean the stronger, non-obvious claim: not simply that most people calling themselves antinatalists, or advocating for antinatalism will have fairly high intelligence, but rather that most people with such a moral stance (perhaps not articulated) will have fairly high intelligence.
Generally, I think there are many weird moral stances you might think your way into that you’d be highly unlikely to find ‘naturally’ (through e.g. absorption of cultural norms).
I’d also expect creativity to positively correlate with outlier moralities. Minds that habitually throw together seven disparate concepts will find crazier notions than those which don’t get beyond three.
First, I think we want to be thinking in terms of [personal morality we’d reflectively endorse] rather than [all the base, weird, conflicting… drivers of behaviour that happen to be in our heads].
There are things most of us would wish to change about ourselves if we could. There’s no sense in baking them in for all eternity (or bargaining on their behalf), just because they happen to form part of what drives us now. [though one does have to be a bit careful here, since it’s easy to miss the upside of qualities we regard as flaws]
With this in mind, reflectively endorsed antinatalism really is a problem: yes, some people will endorse sacrificing everything just to get to a world where there’s no suffering (because there are no people).
Note that the kinds of bargaining approach Vanessa is advocating are aimed at guaranteeing a lower bound for everyone (who’s not pre-filtered out) - so you only need to include one person with a particularly weird view to fail to reach a sensible bargain. [though her most recent version should avoid this]