Scientific consensus doesn’t ‘work’ in the sense of “when it rejects an idea, that idea is always wrong” any more than it “works” in the sense of “when it accepts an idea, that idea is always right”—what’s going on is much better understood in terms of Bayesian evidence, and the apparent asymmetry between accepting and rejecting is actually due to the asymmetry between the evidential status of promoted beliefs versus random possible beliefs.
Bayesianism isn’t about rejection or acceptance it’s about probabilities.
Taleb says that if the scientific consensus tells you that bloodletting is a bad idea, don’t do bloodletting.
On the other if science tells you that drug X is fine, that doesn’t automatically mean it’s good to take the drug.
Scientific consensus doesn’t ‘work’ in the sense of “when it rejects an idea, that idea is always wrong” any more than it “works” in the sense of “when it accepts an idea, that idea is always right”
The problem is that a lot of the people throwing around the term “scientific consensus” seem to believe it does.
Scientific consensus doesn’t ‘work’ in the sense of “when it rejects an idea, that idea is always wrong” any more than it “works” in the sense of “when it accepts an idea, that idea is always right”—what’s going on is much better understood in terms of Bayesian evidence, and the apparent asymmetry between accepting and rejecting is actually due to the asymmetry between the evidential status of promoted beliefs versus random possible beliefs.
Bayesianism isn’t about rejection or acceptance it’s about probabilities.
Taleb says that if the scientific consensus tells you that bloodletting is a bad idea, don’t do bloodletting. On the other if science tells you that drug X is fine, that doesn’t automatically mean it’s good to take the drug.
The problem is that a lot of the people throwing around the term “scientific consensus” seem to believe it does.