Most of the basis of cooperation enforcing structures, I’d argue rests on 2 general principles:
An iterated game, such that there is an equilibrium for cooperation, and
The ability to enforce a threat of violence if a player defects, ideally credibly, and often extends to a monopoly on violence.
Once you have those, cooperative equilibria become possible.
Norms can accomplish this as well—I wrote about this a couple weeks ago.
I basically agree that norms can accomplish this, conditional on the game always being iterated, and indeed conditional on countries being far-sighted enough, almost any outcome is possible, thanks to the folk theorems.
Most of the basis of cooperation enforcing structures, I’d argue rests on 2 general principles:
An iterated game, such that there is an equilibrium for cooperation, and
The ability to enforce a threat of violence if a player defects, ideally credibly, and often extends to a monopoly on violence.
Once you have those, cooperative equilibria become possible.
Norms can accomplish this as well—I wrote about this a couple weeks ago.
I basically agree that norms can accomplish this, conditional on the game always being iterated, and indeed conditional on countries being far-sighted enough, almost any outcome is possible, thanks to the folk theorems.