This professor, who has no doubt debated game theory with many other professors and countless students making all kinds of objections, gets three paragraphs in this article to make a point. Based on this, you figure that the very simple objection that you’re making is news to him?
One thing that concerns me about LW is that it often seems to operate in a vacuum, disconnected from mainstream discourse.
Yes, like I said, given Hamermesh’s credential’s, I didn’t want to jump to any hasty conclusion.
However, professional game theorists do in fact get deceived by the supposed textbook correctness of their conclusions. That’s why I linked the previous Regret of Rationality, which goes over why being “reasonable” and winning so sharply diverge. It’s also part of why no one ever wins the “guess a third of the average guess” by guessing zero, despite its correctness proof.
If Hamermesh did have some understanding of the issues I raised, it would have taken him very little—even within the bounds of three paragraphs—to make it clear. Just a simple “But Ashley may not get invited to many parties after this” would have sufficed.
But not only did Hamermesh not make such an acknowledgement, you can see from his tone that he quite clearly believes there is “a” correct way to play for that scenario, irrespective of what metagames it might be embedded in.
The other 7 students booed her, but I got the class to join me in applauding her, as she was the only one who understood the game.
The fact that students booed doesn’t seem to have registered as a relevant piece of evidence to him, in its significance to other games that might be going on.
Finally, the only reason Ashley walked away with any money at all is because she happened to get lucky that someone else didn’t defect with $0.06, or $0.07, or …, which she had no way of knowing wouldn’t happen. So what’s the skill he’s rewarding here?
As soon as he said “she was the only one who understood the game,” I wondered whether he really understood the game, broadly construed.
Especially if we imagine some reasonable distribution of other players’ actions, breaking from cooperation only benefits the player when 1) you bid the highest and therefore receive the money, or 2) everybody (or a majority) breaks cooperation and you don’t look bad for doing so.
Even then, 1) is only good if the money outweighs the social costs. Heck, there might be future financial costs, if they play cooperation games in the future in that class!
If he’s really on top of the situation, why did he say the equilibrium was $17.50? Obviously this isn’t an equilibrium, since anybody wins by defecting to $17.51. The equilibria are $19.99 and $20.00.
This professor, who has no doubt debated game theory with many other professors and countless students making all kinds of objections, gets three paragraphs in this article to make a point. Based on this, you figure that the very simple objection that you’re making is news to him?
One thing that concerns me about LW is that it often seems to operate in a vacuum, disconnected from mainstream discourse.
Yes, like I said, given Hamermesh’s credential’s, I didn’t want to jump to any hasty conclusion.
However, professional game theorists do in fact get deceived by the supposed textbook correctness of their conclusions. That’s why I linked the previous Regret of Rationality, which goes over why being “reasonable” and winning so sharply diverge. It’s also part of why no one ever wins the “guess a third of the average guess” by guessing zero, despite its correctness proof.
If Hamermesh did have some understanding of the issues I raised, it would have taken him very little—even within the bounds of three paragraphs—to make it clear. Just a simple “But Ashley may not get invited to many parties after this” would have sufficed.
But not only did Hamermesh not make such an acknowledgement, you can see from his tone that he quite clearly believes there is “a” correct way to play for that scenario, irrespective of what metagames it might be embedded in.
The fact that students booed doesn’t seem to have registered as a relevant piece of evidence to him, in its significance to other games that might be going on.
Finally, the only reason Ashley walked away with any money at all is because she happened to get lucky that someone else didn’t defect with $0.06, or $0.07, or …, which she had no way of knowing wouldn’t happen. So what’s the skill he’s rewarding here?
As soon as he said “she was the only one who understood the game,” I wondered whether he really understood the game, broadly construed.
Especially if we imagine some reasonable distribution of other players’ actions, breaking from cooperation only benefits the player when 1) you bid the highest and therefore receive the money, or 2) everybody (or a majority) breaks cooperation and you don’t look bad for doing so.
Even then, 1) is only good if the money outweighs the social costs. Heck, there might be future financial costs, if they play cooperation games in the future in that class!
Btw, they bold every name on the Freakonomics blog, at least the first time they are said in a particular post.
Oh. Oops. Guess I laid it on a little too thick there :-P
Don’t worry, I still voted you up, even after such an egregious error ;)
This is one of the purest examples I have seen in a while of argument from authority, congratulations!
If he’s really on top of the situation, why did he say the equilibrium was $17.50? Obviously this isn’t an equilibrium, since anybody wins by defecting to $17.51. The equilibria are $19.99 and $20.00.
Seconded.