“mortal” implies that a thing is capable of transitioning from one state to another. This would be more like trying to create a tearm, aled, which those things that have the property of being aled where time=-T are alive but where time=+T are dead...
And yet no events are to have occured at time=T. This is a material contradiction. Even worse; another possible meaning would be that things which are aled where time=-T are alive where time=n; and, simultaneously, things which are aled where time=+T are dead where time=n.
And yet the same group of objects are to have the characteristic of being aled -- yet, again, no events are to have occurred.
This is paradoxical, certainly—but only because the definition contradicts itself. grue and bleen require that A=¬A; a false assertion. (EDIT: Apparently I need to explain that the paradox I mention hereIS NOT the Goodman’s Grue Paradox.)
Contrastingly, those things which are “mortal” are defined as having having a unique time=d, where time=-d they are alive; where time=+d they are dead; and where time=d they transition states.
Can you clarify what prevents a grue/bleen categorizer from saying that when a grue object changes the frequency of light that it reflects (which is something every grue object does at one time or another), that’s an event?
when a grue object changes the frequency of light that it reflects (which is something every grue object does at one time or another)
That’s just it—to be “grue” its color must never change from the color “grue”. “Grue” is a color. Not two colors—just one. If this confuses you—it should. It’s a self-contradicting definition. “Grue” is a violation of the Law of Identity.
I agree that its color never changes from the color grue, nor did I suggest that it did. I’m still curious about the answer to my question (which was about light frequencies, not colors), though.
I am talking about an observer who experiences certain colors in response to certain patterns of light frequencies over time. So, both.
Here’s the thing: “grue” and “bleen” are each only one color. For this to be explicable to your understanding, “grue” would have to have one and only one light frequency for time=n.
The problem of course is that this light frequency is apparently the same as “green” at time=-T, but the same as “blue” at time=+T.
The very definition of “grue” is such that A=¬A.
Should we introduce to the “grue-ites” the notion that objects can change color—then they would be incapable of maintaining their belief in “grue”. Essentially; this entire conversation is predicated upon “grue-ites” existing in a universe without light-frequencies but still possessing color. This is, of course, explicitly contradictory: colors are frequencies of light (as experienced by observers).
1) If the definition of “grue” is such that the light reflected by a “grue” object is the same frequency at all times, and further that the observer’s eyes don’t change and more generally that nothing in the world changes, then I agree with you that “grue” as defined is a contradictory idea, for essentially the reasons you cite.
2) In the real world, “green” is not associated with one and only one light frequency. There are lots of light frequencies that would cause me to experience a sensation I’d label “green”. Indeed, I am seeing several dozen of those frequencies as I write this.
3) In the real world, there is no light frequency associated with “green” and only “green”. There are lots of situations that will cause me to experience an object reflecting a single light frequency as different colors.
In the real world, there is no light frequency associated with “green” and only “green”. There are lots of situations that will cause me to experience an object reflecting a single light frequency as different colors.
For example: change the background color or design an elaborate pattern in a picture. There are some freaky things our brains can do (and can be tricked into doing).
(nods) Or just shine a red light in my eyes for a while, then turn it off.
It’s not even particularly freaky, it’s just that we’re accustomed to treating certain aspects of our perceived environment as primitive atoms of perception when in fact they are the outputs of complicated heuristics that aren’t perfectly calibrated for consistency.
Freaky as in an incredible feat on the behalf of our brain to be able to reconstruct 3d images from subtle clues like relative shading. Giving deceptive input to make it perceive color incorrectly is just a harmless side effect.
There are lots of situations that will cause me to experience an object reflecting a single light frequency as different colors.
Under naively realistic conditions this is a non-issue. If one takes a statistically relevant sampling size of humans at random, and asks them their assessment of the color, they will agree based on its light frequency as the sole understandably relevant qualifier.
Indeed, I am seeing several dozen of those frequencies as I write this.
Frequencies are identified as a spectrum, not as a single point. Furthermore—you can differentiate from one variety to another. But an objecct which is one variety of green (that occupies one specific point) does not become another variety of green without undergoing a transition event.
If the definition of “grue” is such that the light reflected by a “grue” object is the same frequency at all times, and further that the observer’s eyes don’t change and more generally that nothing in the world changes,
There’s a reason why the paradox’s definition completely fails to delve into the physical technicalities of the claim.
This is why I was able to rephrase it with the aled concept.
“mortal” implies that a thing is capable of transitioning from one state to another. This would be more like trying to create a tearm,
aled, which those things that have the property of beingaledwhere time=-T are alive but where time=+T are dead...And yet no events are to have occured at time=T. This is a material contradiction. Even worse; another possible meaning would be that things which are
aledwhere time=-T are alive where time=n; and, simultaneously, things which arealedwhere time=+T are dead where time=n.And yet the same group of objects are to have the characteristic of being
aled-- yet, again, no events are to have occurred.This is paradoxical, certainly—but only because the definition contradicts itself.
grueandbleenrequire thatA=¬A; a false assertion. (EDIT: Apparently I need to explain that the paradox I mention here IS NOT the Goodman’s Grue Paradox.)Contrastingly, those things which are “mortal” are defined as having having a unique time=d, where time=-d they are alive; where time=+d they are dead; and where time=d they transition states.
Can you clarify what prevents a grue/bleen categorizer from saying that when a grue object changes the frequency of light that it reflects (which is something every grue object does at one time or another), that’s an event?
That’s just it—to be “grue” its color must never change from the color “grue”. “Grue” is a color. Not two colors—just one. If this confuses you—it should. It’s a self-contradicting definition. “Grue” is a violation of the Law of Identity.
I agree that its color never changes from the color grue, nor did I suggest that it did. I’m still curious about the answer to my question (which was about light frequencies, not colors), though.
Please pick one: are we discussing “grue/bleen categorizors” or are we discussing “light frequencies”? Because the topics are mutually exclusive.
I am talking about an observer who experiences certain colors in response to certain patterns of light frequencies over time. So, both.
If that’s a contradiction in terms, then I’m likely too confused to contribute usefully to further discussion.
Here’s the thing: “grue” and “bleen” are each only one color. For this to be explicable to your understanding, “grue” would have to have one and only one light frequency for time=n.
The problem of course is that this light frequency is apparently the same as “green” at time=-T, but the same as “blue” at time=+T.
The very definition of “grue” is such that
A=¬A.Should we introduce to the “grue-ites” the notion that objects can change color—then they would be incapable of maintaining their belief in “grue”. Essentially; this entire conversation is predicated upon “grue-ites” existing in a universe without light-frequencies but still possessing color. This is, of course, explicitly contradictory: colors are frequencies of light (as experienced by observers).
Three things.
1) If the definition of “grue” is such that the light reflected by a “grue” object is the same frequency at all times, and further that the observer’s eyes don’t change and more generally that nothing in the world changes, then I agree with you that “grue” as defined is a contradictory idea, for essentially the reasons you cite.
2) In the real world, “green” is not associated with one and only one light frequency. There are lots of light frequencies that would cause me to experience a sensation I’d label “green”. Indeed, I am seeing several dozen of those frequencies as I write this.
3) In the real world, there is no light frequency associated with “green” and only “green”. There are lots of situations that will cause me to experience an object reflecting a single light frequency as different colors.
For example: change the background color or design an elaborate pattern in a picture. There are some freaky things our brains can do (and can be tricked into doing).
(nods) Or just shine a red light in my eyes for a while, then turn it off.
It’s not even particularly freaky, it’s just that we’re accustomed to treating certain aspects of our perceived environment as primitive atoms of perception when in fact they are the outputs of complicated heuristics that aren’t perfectly calibrated for consistency.
Freaky as in an incredible feat on the behalf of our brain to be able to reconstruct 3d images from subtle clues like relative shading. Giving deceptive input to make it perceive color incorrectly is just a harmless side effect.
Ah. Yes.
As optimizing systems go, we leave a lot to be desired, but for self-organizing soup we’re pretty impressive.
Under naively realistic conditions this is a non-issue. If one takes a statistically relevant sampling size of humans at random, and asks them their assessment of the color, they will agree based on its light frequency as the sole understandably relevant qualifier.
Frequencies are identified as a spectrum, not as a single point. Furthermore—you can differentiate from one variety to another. But an objecct which is one variety of green (that occupies one specific point) does not become another variety of green without undergoing a transition event.
There’s a reason why the paradox’s definition completely fails to delve into the physical technicalities of the claim.
This is why I was able to rephrase it with the
aledconcept.Err… no? Sometimes they are identified as a spectrum and sometimes as a single point.