For saying “fine” when greeted with “how are you?” or “how’s it going?” to be a case of deception in addition to pragmatics, it would need to be the case that the person saying “fine” expects to be understood as saying that their life is in fact going well.
I don’t think people generally expect that.
(Though there’s something kinda a bit like that that people maybe do expect. If my life is really terrible at the moment then maybe my desire for sympathy might outweigh my respect for standard conventions and make me answer “pretty bad, actually” instead of “fine”; so when I don’t do that, I am giving some indication that my life isn’t going toooo badly; so if it actually is but I still say “fine”, maybe I’m being deceptive. But that’s only the case in so far as, in fact, if my life were going badly enough then I would be likely not to do that.)
Having this convention isn’t (so it seems to me) “optimizing against clarity” in any strong sense. That is: sure, there are other possible conventions that would yield greater clarity, but it’s not so clear that they’re better that it makes sense to say that choosing this convention instead is “optimizing against clarity”. (For comparison: imagine that someone proposes a different convention: whenever two people meet, they exchange bank balances and recent medical histories. This would indeed bring greater clarity; I don’t think most of us would want that clarity; but it seems unfair to say that we’re “optimizing against clarity” if we choose not to have it.)
For saying “fine” when greeted with “how are you?” or “how’s it going?” to be a case of deception in addition to pragmatics, it would need to be the case that the person saying “fine” expects to be understood as saying that their life is in fact going well.
Almost no one expects marketers to actually tell the truth about their products, and yet it seems pretty clear that marketing is deceptive. I think this has to do with common knowledge: even though nearly everyone knows marketing is deceptive, this isn’t common knowledge to the point where an ad could contain the phrase “I am lying to you right now” without it being jarring.
Having this convention isn’t (so it seems to me) “optimizing against clarity” in any strong sense. That is: sure, there are other possible conventions that would yield greater clarity, but it’s not so clear that they’re better that it makes sense to say that choosing this convention instead is “optimizing against clarity”
The convention is optimized for preventing people from giving information about their state that would break the narrative that Things Are Fine. People’s mental processes during the conversation will actually be optimizing against breaking this narrative even in cases where it is false. See Ben’s comment here.
You may be right about marketing and common knowledge; if so, then I suggest that the standard “how are you? fine” script is common knowledge; everyone knows that a “fine” answer can be, and likely will be, given even if the person in question is not doing well at all.
I agree that when executing the how-are-you-fine script people are ipso facto discouraged from giving information about their state that contradicts Things Are Fine. That’s because when executing that script, no one is actually giving any information about their state at all. If you actually want to find out how someone’s life is going, that isn’t how you do it; you ask them some less stereotyped question and, if they trust you sufficiently, they will answer it.
Again, if the how-are-you-fine script were taken as a serious attempt to extract (one one side) and provide (on the other) information about how someone’s life is going, then for sure it would be deceptive. But that’s not how anyone generally uses it, and I don’t see a particular reason why it should be.
The convention is optimized for preventing people from giving information about their state that would break the narrative that Things Are Fine.
You have made this sort of assertion several times now; I’d like to see some elaboration on it. What sorts of social contexts do you have in mind, when you say such things? On what basis do you make this sort of claim?
Person A and B are acquaintances. A asks B “how are you?” B is having serious problems at work, will probably be fired, and face serious economic consequences. B says “fine.” Why did B say “fine” when B was in fact not fine?
Suppose B said “I’m going to lose my job and be really poor for the near future.” Prediction: this will be awkward. Why would this be awkward?
Hypothesis: it is awkward because it contradicts the idea that things are fine. While this contradiction exists in the conversation, A and B will feel tension. Tension can be resolved in a few ways. A could say “oh don’t worry, you can get another job,” contradicting the idea that there is a problem in an unhelpful way that nevertheless restores the narrative that things are fine. A could also say “wow that really sucks, let me know if you need help” agreeing that things aren’t fine and resolving the tension by offering assistance. But A might not want to actually offer assistance in some cases. A could also just say “wow that sucks;” this does not resolve the tension as much as in the previous case, but it does at least mean that A and B are currently agreeing that things aren’t fine, and A has sympathy with B, which ameliorates the tension.
Compare: rising action in a story, which produces tension that must be resolved somehow.
The account you present is rather abstract, and seems to be based on a sort of “narrative” view of social interactions. I am not sure I understand this view well enough to criticize it coherently; I also am not sure what motivates it. (It is also not obvious to me what could falsify the hypothesis in question, nor what it predicts, etc. Certainly I would appreciate a link or two to a more in-depth discussion of this sort of view.)
In any case, there are some quite obvious alternate hypotheses, some of which have been mentioned elsethread, viz.:
All of these alternate hypotheses (and similar ones) make use only of simple, straightforward interests and desires of individuals, and have no need to bring in abstract “narrative” concepts.
For saying “fine” when greeted with “how are you?” or “how’s it going?” to be a case of deception in addition to pragmatics, it would need to be the case that the person saying “fine” expects to be understood as saying that their life is in fact going well.
I don’t think people generally expect that.
(Though there’s something kinda a bit like that that people maybe do expect. If my life is really terrible at the moment then maybe my desire for sympathy might outweigh my respect for standard conventions and make me answer “pretty bad, actually” instead of “fine”; so when I don’t do that, I am giving some indication that my life isn’t going toooo badly; so if it actually is but I still say “fine”, maybe I’m being deceptive. But that’s only the case in so far as, in fact, if my life were going badly enough then I would be likely not to do that.)
Having this convention isn’t (so it seems to me) “optimizing against clarity” in any strong sense. That is: sure, there are other possible conventions that would yield greater clarity, but it’s not so clear that they’re better that it makes sense to say that choosing this convention instead is “optimizing against clarity”. (For comparison: imagine that someone proposes a different convention: whenever two people meet, they exchange bank balances and recent medical histories. This would indeed bring greater clarity; I don’t think most of us would want that clarity; but it seems unfair to say that we’re “optimizing against clarity” if we choose not to have it.)
Almost no one expects marketers to actually tell the truth about their products, and yet it seems pretty clear that marketing is deceptive. I think this has to do with common knowledge: even though nearly everyone knows marketing is deceptive, this isn’t common knowledge to the point where an ad could contain the phrase “I am lying to you right now” without it being jarring.
The convention is optimized for preventing people from giving information about their state that would break the narrative that Things Are Fine. People’s mental processes during the conversation will actually be optimizing against breaking this narrative even in cases where it is false. See Ben’s comment here.
You may be right about marketing and common knowledge; if so, then I suggest that the standard “how are you? fine” script is common knowledge; everyone knows that a “fine” answer can be, and likely will be, given even if the person in question is not doing well at all.
I agree that when executing the how-are-you-fine script people are ipso facto discouraged from giving information about their state that contradicts Things Are Fine. That’s because when executing that script, no one is actually giving any information about their state at all. If you actually want to find out how someone’s life is going, that isn’t how you do it; you ask them some less stereotyped question and, if they trust you sufficiently, they will answer it.
Again, if the how-are-you-fine script were taken as a serious attempt to extract (one one side) and provide (on the other) information about how someone’s life is going, then for sure it would be deceptive. But that’s not how anyone generally uses it, and I don’t see a particular reason why it should be.
I was going to write a longer response but this thread covers what I wanted to say pretty well.
You have made this sort of assertion several times now; I’d like to see some elaboration on it. What sorts of social contexts do you have in mind, when you say such things? On what basis do you make this sort of claim?
Person A and B are acquaintances. A asks B “how are you?” B is having serious problems at work, will probably be fired, and face serious economic consequences. B says “fine.” Why did B say “fine” when B was in fact not fine?
Suppose B said “I’m going to lose my job and be really poor for the near future.” Prediction: this will be awkward. Why would this be awkward?
Hypothesis: it is awkward because it contradicts the idea that things are fine. While this contradiction exists in the conversation, A and B will feel tension. Tension can be resolved in a few ways. A could say “oh don’t worry, you can get another job,” contradicting the idea that there is a problem in an unhelpful way that nevertheless restores the narrative that things are fine. A could also say “wow that really sucks, let me know if you need help” agreeing that things aren’t fine and resolving the tension by offering assistance. But A might not want to actually offer assistance in some cases. A could also just say “wow that sucks;” this does not resolve the tension as much as in the previous case, but it does at least mean that A and B are currently agreeing that things aren’t fine, and A has sympathy with B, which ameliorates the tension.
Compare: rising action in a story, which produces tension that must be resolved somehow.
I see.
The account you present is rather abstract, and seems to be based on a sort of “narrative” view of social interactions. I am not sure I understand this view well enough to criticize it coherently; I also am not sure what motivates it. (It is also not obvious to me what could falsify the hypothesis in question, nor what it predicts, etc. Certainly I would appreciate a link or two to a more in-depth discussion of this sort of view.)
In any case, there are some quite obvious alternate hypotheses, some of which have been mentioned elsethread, viz.:
The “Copenhagen interpretation of ethics”
Guarding against a disadvantageous change in power relations
A simple desire for privacy
All of these alternate hypotheses (and similar ones) make use only of simple, straightforward interests and desires of individuals, and have no need to bring in abstract “narrative” concepts.