They both have an element of privileging the hypothesis. If I had some reason to think I lived in a universe with an Omega/God then I might agree I should one-box/believe in god but since I don’t have any reason to think I live in such a universe why am I wasting my time even considering this particular implausible scenario?
I see what you mean, but there exists one of two problems with the symmetry.
First, the most annoying form of Pascal’s Wager is the epistemological version: “Believing that God exists has positive expected utility, so you should do so”. This argument fails logically, for reasons SilasBarta listed, and it is usually this form being refuted when people say, “Pascal’s Wager fails”.
Second, the form of Pascal’s Wager concerning worship, “Believing in God, who is known to exist, has positive utility”, has moral complexities which are absent from Newcomb’s dilemma. Objections in this case usually arise from the normative argument that you should not believe things which are false.
First, the most annoying form of Pascal’s Wager is the epistemological version: “Believing that God exists has positive expected utility, so you should do so”. This argument fails logically, for reasons SilasBarta listed, and it is usually this form being refuted when people say, “Pascal’s Wager fails”.
I disagree that it fails logically. The argument, written modus ponens, is:
“If believing in God has positive expected utility, then you should do so”.
If you don’t believe that believing in God has positive expected utility, then this is not a disagreement in the logic of Pascal’s Wager. Pascal’s Wager would equally say,
“If believing in God has negative expected utility, then you should not do so”.
I disagree that it fails logically. The argument, written modus ponens, is:
“If believing in God has positive expected utility, then you should do so”.
Okay, now I think I’m starting to see the miscommunication: PW does not simply say what you’ve quoted there. It’s typically associated with an argument about how the possibility of infinite utility from believing (and perhaps infinite disutility from not believing) outweights the small probability of it being true, and the utility of other courses of action, on account of its infinite size.
You’re taking “Pascal’s Wager” to refer only to certain premises the argument uses, not the full argument itself.
It occurred to me that you might not agree that my distillation of PW contained all the salient features. (For example, there are no infinitesimals and no infinities written in). However, I think it must have been my more general argument that PeerInfinity was referring to, because he was applying it to atheism.
They both have an element of privileging the hypothesis. If I had some reason to think I lived in a universe with an Omega/God then I might agree I should one-box/believe in god but since I don’t have any reason to think I live in such a universe why am I wasting my time even considering this particular implausible scenario?
I see what you mean, but there exists one of two problems with the symmetry.
First, the most annoying form of Pascal’s Wager is the epistemological version: “Believing that God exists has positive expected utility, so you should do so”. This argument fails logically, for reasons SilasBarta listed, and it is usually this form being refuted when people say, “Pascal’s Wager fails”.
Second, the form of Pascal’s Wager concerning worship, “Believing in God, who is known to exist, has positive utility”, has moral complexities which are absent from Newcomb’s dilemma. Objections in this case usually arise from the normative argument that you should not believe things which are false.
I disagree that it fails logically. The argument, written modus ponens, is:
“If believing in God has positive expected utility, then you should do so”.
If you don’t believe that believing in God has positive expected utility, then this is not a disagreement in the logic of Pascal’s Wager. Pascal’s Wager would equally say, “If believing in God has negative expected utility, then you should not do so”.
Okay, now I think I’m starting to see the miscommunication: PW does not simply say what you’ve quoted there. It’s typically associated with an argument about how the possibility of infinite utility from believing (and perhaps infinite disutility from not believing) outweights the small probability of it being true, and the utility of other courses of action, on account of its infinite size.
You’re taking “Pascal’s Wager” to refer only to certain premises the argument uses, not the full argument itself.
It occurred to me that you might not agree that my distillation of PW contained all the salient features. (For example, there are no infinitesimals and no infinities written in). However, I think it must have been my more general argument that PeerInfinity was referring to, because he was applying it to atheism.