I suspect that the near-universal rejection of naive-CDT ALSO means that they recognize this offer is outside the bounds of situations that CDT can handle. How does this CDT agent reconcile a belief that the seller’s prediction likelihood is different from the buyer’s success likelihood?
Note that while people on this forum mostly reject orthodox, two-boxing CDT, many academic philosophers favor CDT. I doubt that they would view this problem as out of CDT’s scope, since it’s pretty similar to Newcomb’s problem. (ETA: We discuss these “out of scope” objections in Section IV.2 of the paper.)
How does this CDT agent reconcile a belief that the seller’s prediction likelihood is different from the buyer’s success likelihood?
Please provide a few links to recent (say, 10 years—not textbooks written long ago) papers or even blog posts that defends CDT and/or advocates 2-boxing in this (or other Newcomb-like) scenarios.
In his book Causality, Judea Pearl also argues in favor of CDT (though he doesn’t explicitly discuss Newcomb’s problem).
In case you just want to know why I believe support for CDT/two-boxing to be wide-spread among academic philosophers, see https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP.pdf , which is a survey of academic philosophers, where more people preferred two-boxing than one-boxing in Newcomb’s problem, especially among philosophers with relevant expertise. Some philosophers have filled out this survey publicly, so you can e.g. go to https://philpapers.org/surveys/public_respondents.html?set=Target+faculty , click on a name and then on “My Philosophical Views” to find individuals who endorse two-boxing. (I think there’s also a way to download the raw data and thereby get a list of two-boxers.)
I suspect that the near-universal rejection of naive-CDT ALSO means that they recognize this offer is outside the bounds of situations that CDT can handle. How does this CDT agent reconcile a belief that the seller’s prediction likelihood is different from the buyer’s success likelihood?
Note that while people on this forum mostly reject orthodox, two-boxing CDT, many academic philosophers favor CDT. I doubt that they would view this problem as out of CDT’s scope, since it’s pretty similar to Newcomb’s problem. (ETA: We discuss these “out of scope” objections in Section IV.2 of the paper.)
Good question!
Excellent—we should ask THEM about it.
Please provide a few links to recent (say, 10 years—not textbooks written long ago) papers or even blog posts that defends CDT and/or advocates 2-boxing in this (or other Newcomb-like) scenarios.
Yes, that’s the plan.
Some papers that express support for CDT:
https://philarchive.org/archive/ARMCDT-2
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-011-0022-6 (In general, James Joyce is a well-known defender of CDT.)
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-018-1206-4
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phpr.12466 (argues for two-boxing, but against CDT)
In his book Causality, Judea Pearl also argues in favor of CDT (though he doesn’t explicitly discuss Newcomb’s problem).
In case you just want to know why I believe support for CDT/two-boxing to be wide-spread among academic philosophers, see https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP.pdf , which is a survey of academic philosophers, where more people preferred two-boxing than one-boxing in Newcomb’s problem, especially among philosophers with relevant expertise. Some philosophers have filled out this survey publicly, so you can e.g. go to https://philpapers.org/surveys/public_respondents.html?set=Target+faculty , click on a name and then on “My Philosophical Views” to find individuals who endorse two-boxing. (I think there’s also a way to download the raw data and thereby get a list of two-boxers.)