You can solve the domination problem by just picking a vote at random, and having that vote be the deciding vote. So if 49% of people vote for Bush, and 49% vote for Gore, and 2% vote for Nader, then Bush, Gore and Nader have a 49, 49 and 2% chance of winning respectively. In this system, you can always vote for your favorite candidate without worrying about how electable they are.
(one example of an unreasonable system that eliminates tactical voting is picking one ballot at random and determining the results based solely on its preferences; the precise text of the theorem rules out “nondeterministic or dictatorial” methods).
This. I used to be a prolific lesswrong contributor on another account until I realized that everything I wrote felt insufficiently edited and researched and I devolved into lurkerhood. It would be much easier posting here if I had not someone recieved the impression this was actually a high status site.
You can solve the domination problem by just picking a vote at random, and having that vote be the deciding vote. So if 49% of people vote for Bush, and 49% vote for Gore, and 2% vote for Nader, then Bush, Gore and Nader have a 49, 49 and 2% chance of winning respectively. In this system, you can always vote for your favorite candidate without worrying about how electable they are.
That’s what happens when you skim articles before work :P
This. I used to be a prolific lesswrong contributor on another account until I realized that everything I wrote felt insufficiently edited and researched and I devolved into lurkerhood. It would be much easier posting here if I had not someone recieved the impression this was actually a high status site.