If you know that a future FAI will take all actions necessary that lead to its faster creation, you can derive that it will also punish those who knew it would, but didn’t make FAI happen faster.
But punishing them occurs after it has been created, and no action that it performs after it was created can cause it to have been created earlier than it was actually created. Therefore such post-singularity punishment is futile and a FAI would not perform it.
The only consideration in this scenario which can actually affect the time of an FAI’s creation is the pre-singularity fear of people who anticipated post-singularity punishment. But any actual future FAI is not itself responsible for this fear, and therefore not responsible for the consequences of that fear. Those consequences are entirely a product of ideas internal to the minds of pre-singularity people, such as ideas about the dispositions of post-singularity AIs.
Aside from the fact that I already changed my mind and came to the conclusion that an FAI won’t punish, I’d still object: In case we can anticipate an FAI which does not punish, we wouldn’t feel obliged (or be tempted to feel obliged) to speed up its development. That means that an AI would be better off to foreseeably punish people, and if the AI is friendly, then it has a mind design which maximizes the utility functions of humans. If that involves having a mind-design such that people anticipate punishment and thereby speed up its development, so is it. Especially the fact that we know it’s a friendly AI makes it very easy for us to anticipate its actions, which the AI knows as well. This line of argument still holds, the chain breaks at a weaker link.
But punishing them occurs after it has been created, and no action that it performs after it was created can cause it to have been created earlier than it was actually created. Therefore such post-singularity punishment is futile and a FAI would not perform it.
The only consideration in this scenario which can actually affect the time of an FAI’s creation is the pre-singularity fear of people who anticipated post-singularity punishment. But any actual future FAI is not itself responsible for this fear, and therefore not responsible for the consequences of that fear. Those consequences are entirely a product of ideas internal to the minds of pre-singularity people, such as ideas about the dispositions of post-singularity AIs.
Aside from the fact that I already changed my mind and came to the conclusion that an FAI won’t punish, I’d still object: In case we can anticipate an FAI which does not punish, we wouldn’t feel obliged (or be tempted to feel obliged) to speed up its development. That means that an AI would be better off to foreseeably punish people, and if the AI is friendly, then it has a mind design which maximizes the utility functions of humans. If that involves having a mind-design such that people anticipate punishment and thereby speed up its development, so is it. Especially the fact that we know it’s a friendly AI makes it very easy for us to anticipate its actions, which the AI knows as well. This line of argument still holds, the chain breaks at a weaker link.