I didn’t explicitly claim so. But it involves reasoning from a perspective that is impartial to any moment. This independency manifested in its core assumption: that one should regard themself to be randomly selected from all observers from its reference class from past, present and future
I think I don’t understand what makes you say that anthropic reasoning requires “reasoning from a perspective that is impartial to any moment”. The way I think about this is the following:
If I imagine how an omnitemporal, omniscient being would see me, I imagine they would see me as a randomly selected sample from all humans, past present and future (which don’t really exist for the being).
From my point of view, it does feel weird to say that “I’m a randomly selected sample”, but I certainly don’t feel like there is anything special about the year I was born. This, combined with the fact that I’m obviously human, is just a from-my-point-of-view way of saying the same thing. I’m a human and I have no reason to belive the year I was born is special == I’m a human whose birth year is a sample randomly taken from the population of all possible humans.
What changes when you switch perspectives is just the words, not the point. I guess you’re thinking about this differently? Do you think you can state where we’re disagreeing?
When you say the time of your birth is not special, you are already trying to judge it objectively. For you personally, the moment of your birth is special. And more relevantly to the DA, from a first-person perspective, the moment “now” is special.
From an objective viewpoint, discussing a specific observer or a specific moment requires some explanation, something process pointing to it. e.g. a sampling process. Otherwise, it fails to be objective by inherently focusing on someone/sometime.
From a first-person perspective, discussions based on “I” and “now” doesn’t require such an explanation. It’s inherently understandable. The future is just moments after “now”. Its prediction ought to be based on my knowledge of the present and past.
What the doomsday argument saying is, the fact “I am this person” (living now) shall be treated the same way as if someone from the objective viewpoint in 1, performs a random sampling and finds me (now). The two cases are supposed to be logically equivalent. So the two viewpoints can say the same thing. I’m saying let’s not make that assumption. And in this case, the objective viewpoint cannot say the same thing as the first-person perspective. So we can’t switch perspectives here.
I didn’t explicitly claim so. But it involves reasoning from a perspective that is impartial to any moment. This independency manifested in its core assumption: that one should regard themself to be randomly selected from all observers from its reference class from past, present and future
I think I don’t understand what makes you say that anthropic reasoning requires “reasoning from a perspective that is impartial to any moment”. The way I think about this is the following:
If I imagine how an omnitemporal, omniscient being would see me, I imagine they would see me as a randomly selected sample from all humans, past present and future (which don’t really exist for the being).
From my point of view, it does feel weird to say that “I’m a randomly selected sample”, but I certainly don’t feel like there is anything special about the year I was born. This, combined with the fact that I’m obviously human, is just a from-my-point-of-view way of saying the same thing. I’m a human and I have no reason to belive the year I was born is special == I’m a human whose birth year is a sample randomly taken from the population of all possible humans.
What changes when you switch perspectives is just the words, not the point. I guess you’re thinking about this differently? Do you think you can state where we’re disagreeing?
When you say the time of your birth is not special, you are already trying to judge it objectively. For you personally, the moment of your birth is special. And more relevantly to the DA, from a first-person perspective, the moment “now” is special.
From an objective viewpoint, discussing a specific observer or a specific moment requires some explanation, something process pointing to it. e.g. a sampling process. Otherwise, it fails to be objective by inherently focusing on someone/sometime.
From a first-person perspective, discussions based on “I” and “now” doesn’t require such an explanation. It’s inherently understandable. The future is just moments after “now”. Its prediction ought to be based on my knowledge of the present and past.
What the doomsday argument saying is, the fact “I am this person” (living now) shall be treated the same way as if someone from the objective viewpoint in 1, performs a random sampling and finds me (now). The two cases are supposed to be logically equivalent. So the two viewpoints can say the same thing. I’m saying let’s not make that assumption. And in this case, the objective viewpoint cannot say the same thing as the first-person perspective. So we can’t switch perspectives here.