It’s hard to define ‘real’; it’s not clear that it’s doing any work. If you’re curious, Gary Drescher in Good and Real (who is on good terms with logic) argues in the last chapter that the real/unreal distinction is not meaningful.
This point was made long ago by J.L. Austin in (I believe) Sense and Sensibilia. Austin points out several things about “real”, among them that “real” is substantive-hungry: You can’t answer “Is such-and-so real?” without asking first, “Is it a real what?”
A decoy duck is not a real duck, but it is a real decoy—whereas a rubber duck is not a real decoy; and a decoy coot might be mistaken for a decoy duck if you know little of waterfowl, but isn’t a real decoy duck.
There is no sense of “real” that applies to all substantives that we would describe as real. The word makes sense only in contrast to specific ways of being unreal: being a forgery, a toy, an hallucination, a fictional character, an exaggeration, a case of mistaken identity, a doctored picture, etc. It is these negative concepts, and not the concept of “real”, that actually do all the explanatory work. “Real” is both ambiguous and negative.
It’s hard to define ‘real’; it’s not clear that it’s doing any work.
“Hard to define” and “not clearly doing any work” are distinct properties; I’d agree about the former and not the latter. I do find it difficult to give a definition of “real” that isn’t going to break when dealing with unusual border cases; but nevertheless, if I consider the question “Is Harry Potter real?”, or “Is Barack Obama real?”, or “Are atoms real?”, then the two possible answers I could give for each will imply distinct models of reality that anticipate different experiences, and furthermore the word “real” can transfer such a model into someone else’s mind pretty successfully. It doesn’t particularly seem to have any of the characteristics of a non-descriptive term.
Err no! He says that ‘real’ means something like causally accessible from where we are. It’s something like “from my perspective I am real, but from the perspective of a fictional-me in a fictional-universe, I am not, while the fictional me is real”. Except this is not a very helpful way to define ‘real’. There is no meta-realness, but relativistic-realness is quite as useless. Drescher dissolves the issue, by reducing ‘real’ to something like “whatever we can possibly get at from where we are in this universe”.
Err no! He says that ‘real’ means something like causally accessible from where we are.
Yes. He has several paragraphs where he points out that the usual understandings of ‘real’ are incoherent in his ‘equations’ framework, and only then goes on to suggest a new and entirely different sort of ‘real’, which isn’t quite causally accessible (since remember, he’s previously arguing for a Parmenidean 4D block-universe) but more one of definition:
Most importantly, they would think and say so for the same sort of reag
son as we do, a reason that must be rooted in the equations themselves
(because the equations themselves ultimately specify every detail of those
thoughts and words), without recourse to any spark of existence. And
even if we did not carry out the computation of what the alternative equa-
tions specify—even if those equations were left out in the cold, unnoticed
and unexamined—those equations would still be specifying a universe in
which intelligent beings perceived and spoke of what they thought is a
spark of existence, just as we do, and for the same reasons.
As with the gravity hypothesis in the mirror-asymmetry paradox back in
section 1.2.3, it becomes superfluous to hypothesize a spark of existence,
that is, some kind of grounding that distinguishes a real universe from an
unrealized set of equations. It is superfluous because the ungrounded equa-
tions must already specify organisms who perceive their universe as real
(i.e., who perceive the apparent spark), just as we do, and for the same rea-
sons that we do. Those perceptions are already inherent in the equations
themselves.
If “real” is an honorific, then it can also be used as a descriptive term.
If “Gary Drescher is not real” is false, then clearly we mean something by the word, which makes it a bit tricky to show that it’s not meaningful. Maybe you could show that real and unreal things have identical properties, aside from their “honorific?” Monsters under the bed refute that one though...
I think you should use a more charitable interpretation. E.g., “A common usage of the world ‘real’”. Obviously you’re going to find some cases where real is used more technically.
Past a small amount of charity it stops being a notable quote and starts being a demonstration of our charity skills, so I’m more reluctant to be nice here than in an argument.
This quote seems logically impossible, among other things.
It’s hard to define ‘real’; it’s not clear that it’s doing any work. If you’re curious, Gary Drescher in Good and Real (who is on good terms with logic) argues in the last chapter that the real/unreal distinction is not meaningful.
This point was made long ago by J.L. Austin in (I believe) Sense and Sensibilia. Austin points out several things about “real”, among them that “real” is substantive-hungry: You can’t answer “Is such-and-so real?” without asking first, “Is it a real what?”
A decoy duck is not a real duck, but it is a real decoy—whereas a rubber duck is not a real decoy; and a decoy coot might be mistaken for a decoy duck if you know little of waterfowl, but isn’t a real decoy duck.
There is no sense of “real” that applies to all substantives that we would describe as real. The word makes sense only in contrast to specific ways of being unreal: being a forgery, a toy, an hallucination, a fictional character, an exaggeration, a case of mistaken identity, a doctored picture, etc. It is these negative concepts, and not the concept of “real”, that actually do all the explanatory work. “Real” is both ambiguous and negative.
“Hard to define” and “not clearly doing any work” are distinct properties; I’d agree about the former and not the latter. I do find it difficult to give a definition of “real” that isn’t going to break when dealing with unusual border cases; but nevertheless, if I consider the question “Is Harry Potter real?”, or “Is Barack Obama real?”, or “Are atoms real?”, then the two possible answers I could give for each will imply distinct models of reality that anticipate different experiences, and furthermore the word “real” can transfer such a model into someone else’s mind pretty successfully. It doesn’t particularly seem to have any of the characteristics of a non-descriptive term.
Err no! He says that ‘real’ means something like causally accessible from where we are. It’s something like “from my perspective I am real, but from the perspective of a fictional-me in a fictional-universe, I am not, while the fictional me is real”. Except this is not a very helpful way to define ‘real’. There is no meta-realness, but relativistic-realness is quite as useless. Drescher dissolves the issue, by reducing ‘real’ to something like “whatever we can possibly get at from where we are in this universe”.
Yes. He has several paragraphs where he points out that the usual understandings of ‘real’ are incoherent in his ‘equations’ framework, and only then goes on to suggest a new and entirely different sort of ‘real’, which isn’t quite causally accessible (since remember, he’s previously arguing for a Parmenidean 4D block-universe) but more one of definition:
If “real” is an honorific, then it can also be used as a descriptive term.
If “Gary Drescher is not real” is false, then clearly we mean something by the word, which makes it a bit tricky to show that it’s not meaningful. Maybe you could show that real and unreal things have identical properties, aside from their “honorific?” Monsters under the bed refute that one though...
I think you should use a more charitable interpretation. E.g., “A common usage of the world ‘real’”. Obviously you’re going to find some cases where real is used more technically.
Past a small amount of charity it stops being a notable quote and starts being a demonstration of our charity skills, so I’m more reluctant to be nice here than in an argument.
How so?
As in my reply to gwern, I was thinking “If “real” is an honorific, then it can also be used as a descriptive term.”