Sorry to be late to the partyâ but has nobody yet mentioned the effect that MWI has on assessing cryonics from a personal standpoint; i.e. that your subjective probability of being revived should very nearly be your probability estimate that revival will happen in some universe? If 9⁄10 of future worlds destroy all cryogenic chambers, and 9⁄10 of the ones left don’t bother to revive you, then it doesn’t matter to you: you’ll still wake up and find yourself in the hundredth world. Such factors only matter if you think your revival would be a significant benefit to the rest of humanity (rather unlikely, in my estimation).
(Yes, there are quirks to be discussed in this idea. I’ve thought about some of them already, but I might have missed others. Anyhow, it’s getting early.)
Sorry to be late to the partyâ but has nobody yet mentioned the effect that MWI has on assessing cryonics from a personal standpoint; i.e. that your subjective probability of being revived should very nearly be your probability estimate that revival will happen in some universe? If 9⁄10 of future worlds destroy all cryogenic chambers, and 9⁄10 of the ones left don’t bother to revive you, then it doesn’t matter to you: you’ll still wake up and find yourself in the hundredth world. Such factors only matter if you think your revival would be a significant benefit to the rest of humanity (rather unlikely, in my estimation).
(Yes, there are quirks to be discussed in this idea. I’ve thought about some of them already, but I might have missed others. Anyhow, it’s getting early.)