Many worlds is an ontological possibility. I don’t regard it as favored ahead of one-world ontologies. I’m not aware of a fully satisfactory, rigorous, realist ontology, even just for relativistic QFT.
Is there a clash between many worlds and what you quoted?
I was thinking that “either it’s there or it’s not” as applied to a conscious state would imply you don’t think consciousness can be in an entangled state, or something along those lines.
But reading it again, it seem like you are saying consciousness is discontinuous? As in, there are no partially-conscious states? Is that right?
I’m also unaware of a fully satisfactory ontology for relativistic QFT, sadly.
Gradations of consciousness, and the possibility of a continuum between consciousness and non-consciousness, are subtle topics; especially when considered in conjunction with concepts whose physical grounding is vague.
Some of the kinds of vagueness that show up:
Many-worlders who are vague about how many worlds there are. This can lead to vagueness about how many minds there are too.
Sorites-style vagueness about the boundary in physical state space between different computational states, and about exactly which microphysical entities count as part of the relevant physical state.
(An example of a microphysically vague state which is being used to define boundaries, is the adaptation of “Markov blanket” by fans of Friston and the free energy principle.)
I think a properly critical discussion of vagueness and continuity, in the context of the mind-brain relationship, would need to figure out which kinds of vagueness can be tolerated and which cannot; and would also caution against hiding bad vagueness behind good vagueness.
Here I mean that sometimes, if one objects to basing mental ontology on microphysically vague concepts of Everett branch or computational state, one is told that this is OK because there’s vagueness in the mental realm too—e.g. vagueness of a color concept, or vagueness of the boundary between being conscious and being unconscious.
Alternatively, one also hears mystical ideas like “all minds are One” being justified on the grounds that the physical world is supposedly a continuum without objective boundaries.
Sometimes, one ends up having to appeal to very basic facts about the experienced world, like, my experience always has a particular form. I am always having a specific experience, in a way that is unaffected by the referential vagueness of the words or concepts I might use to describe it. Or: I am not having your experience, and you are not having mine, the implication being that there is some kind of objective difference or boundary between us.
To me, those are the considerations that can ultimately decide whether a particular proposed psychophysical vagueness is true, possible, or impossible.
Many worlds is an ontological possibility. I don’t regard it as favored ahead of one-world ontologies. I’m not aware of a fully satisfactory, rigorous, realist ontology, even just for relativistic QFT.
Is there a clash between many worlds and what you quoted?
I was thinking that “either it’s there or it’s not” as applied to a conscious state would imply you don’t think consciousness can be in an entangled state, or something along those lines.
But reading it again, it seem like you are saying consciousness is discontinuous? As in, there are no partially-conscious states? Is that right?
I’m also unaware of a fully satisfactory ontology for relativistic QFT, sadly.
Gradations of consciousness, and the possibility of a continuum between consciousness and non-consciousness, are subtle topics; especially when considered in conjunction with concepts whose physical grounding is vague.
Some of the kinds of vagueness that show up:
Many-worlders who are vague about how many worlds there are. This can lead to vagueness about how many minds there are too.
Sorites-style vagueness about the boundary in physical state space between different computational states, and about exactly which microphysical entities count as part of the relevant physical state.
(An example of a microphysically vague state which is being used to define boundaries, is the adaptation of “Markov blanket” by fans of Friston and the free energy principle.)
I think a properly critical discussion of vagueness and continuity, in the context of the mind-brain relationship, would need to figure out which kinds of vagueness can be tolerated and which cannot; and would also caution against hiding bad vagueness behind good vagueness.
Here I mean that sometimes, if one objects to basing mental ontology on microphysically vague concepts of Everett branch or computational state, one is told that this is OK because there’s vagueness in the mental realm too—e.g. vagueness of a color concept, or vagueness of the boundary between being conscious and being unconscious.
Alternatively, one also hears mystical ideas like “all minds are One” being justified on the grounds that the physical world is supposedly a continuum without objective boundaries.
Sometimes, one ends up having to appeal to very basic facts about the experienced world, like, my experience always has a particular form. I am always having a specific experience, in a way that is unaffected by the referential vagueness of the words or concepts I might use to describe it. Or: I am not having your experience, and you are not having mine, the implication being that there is some kind of objective difference or boundary between us.
To me, those are the considerations that can ultimately decide whether a particular proposed psychophysical vagueness is true, possible, or impossible.