I think this quote is sentimentally motivated inaccuracy. It relies upon the romantic notion that if the docile masses were to arise that they would be morally superior to those that do already choose to lead men. I think this thought of Bernanos does not arise from any sort of evidence at all, and that if there is any evidence about what happens when previously docile men rise to power it is that they behave very much like men in power have always behaved in the past, that there is no particularly great wisdom they bring with them on rising. I am thinking in particular of the rise of the communists in Russia and China and more recently the governments that have arisen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Egypt.
It relies upon the romantic notion that if the docile masses were to arise that they would be morally superior to those that do already choose to lead men.
Interesting. I read no such implication in this quote. I see it as a lament that “rebels, insubordinate, untamable men” are basically bred out of the population that becomes more and more sheeple. And the “docile masses” will not revolt opening the way for highly repressive societies.
of the modern man, his base subservient acceptance of every common decree.
These common decrees are coming from men, not the docile masses but the small minority of leaderly men. Where is the existential threat in the common decrees of leaderly men as opposed to the hypothetical actions the masses of docile men would take if they were not docile? I understand neither why one expects an existential threat from the decrees of leaderly men nor why one expects that threat to be countered by the hypothetical actions of docile men made counterfactually non-docile.
Or rather I don’t understand these as things for which there is evidence. An apparently relatively docile Chinese population seems to have done OK under a repressive communist government, certainly not seeming to come close to anything that was an existential threat.
So how is a repressive society an existential threat?
I understand neither why one expects an existential threat from the decrees of leaderly men nor why one expects that threat to be countered by the hypothetical actions of docile men made counterfactually non-docile.
Hm. Let me try to offer a hypothesis. I am not sure I believe it myself, but I’ll throw it out for evaluation.
I think that the existential threat of repressive societies has to do with expected variation.
Societies where general population provides strong inputs into the political process tend to be less adventurous and more mundane. It’s decision-making by committee and committees rarely make unexpected, radical decisions. Regression to the mean is the rule and keeps things contained.
Autocratic societies, on the other hand, don’t have these built-in brakes. Small ruling elites are subject to less constraints and can take off into strange directions some of which are dangerous. In particular, small elites see much less problems with killing large numbers of people (compared to more-or-less democratic societies) in pursuit of goals they find worthy.
Now, this is not saying that autocratic societies are “bad” and democratic ones are “good”. What this hypothesis asserts is that the the range of behavior of autocratic societies will be wider than that of democratic societies.
P.S. And that, of course, is speaking just of existential threat and not about which society it’s better to live in.
Hmm, that’s a good point. I can see how this might seem like a romantic/Marxist/anti-elite sentiment.
When I read it, I was thinking almost exclusively in terms of existential risk, the connection being that the end of the world (by, for instance, Unfriendly AI) won’t be brought about by a cruel mad scientist, but more likely by normal people trying to make economic and scientific advances without concern for the potential consequences.
Sorry if the quote doesn’t communicate that very clearly.
That might say more about how populist movements tend to work than about the character of the docile masses, to use your phrase, when raised to power. It’s rather uncommon for first-generation revolutionary leaders to come from the lower social classes: Stalin is an exception, but he’s the only one I can think of among famous communists, and in any case he arguably belonged to the second generation of his revolution. Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao all emerged from upper middle-class backgrounds, roughly speaking, although their exact circumstances differed. Fidel Castro came from an upper-class family.
I think this quote is sentimentally motivated inaccuracy. It relies upon the romantic notion that if the docile masses were to arise that they would be morally superior to those that do already choose to lead men. I think this thought of Bernanos does not arise from any sort of evidence at all, and that if there is any evidence about what happens when previously docile men rise to power it is that they behave very much like men in power have always behaved in the past, that there is no particularly great wisdom they bring with them on rising. I am thinking in particular of the rise of the communists in Russia and China and more recently the governments that have arisen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Egypt.
Interesting. I read no such implication in this quote. I see it as a lament that “rebels, insubordinate, untamable men” are basically bred out of the population that becomes more and more sheeple. And the “docile masses” will not revolt opening the way for highly repressive societies.
From the original quote:
These common decrees are coming from men, not the docile masses but the small minority of leaderly men. Where is the existential threat in the common decrees of leaderly men as opposed to the hypothetical actions the masses of docile men would take if they were not docile? I understand neither why one expects an existential threat from the decrees of leaderly men nor why one expects that threat to be countered by the hypothetical actions of docile men made counterfactually non-docile.
Or rather I don’t understand these as things for which there is evidence. An apparently relatively docile Chinese population seems to have done OK under a repressive communist government, certainly not seeming to come close to anything that was an existential threat.
So how is a repressive society an existential threat?
Hm. Let me try to offer a hypothesis. I am not sure I believe it myself, but I’ll throw it out for evaluation.
I think that the existential threat of repressive societies has to do with expected variation.
Societies where general population provides strong inputs into the political process tend to be less adventurous and more mundane. It’s decision-making by committee and committees rarely make unexpected, radical decisions. Regression to the mean is the rule and keeps things contained.
Autocratic societies, on the other hand, don’t have these built-in brakes. Small ruling elites are subject to less constraints and can take off into strange directions some of which are dangerous. In particular, small elites see much less problems with killing large numbers of people (compared to more-or-less democratic societies) in pursuit of goals they find worthy.
Now, this is not saying that autocratic societies are “bad” and democratic ones are “good”. What this hypothesis asserts is that the the range of behavior of autocratic societies will be wider than that of democratic societies.
P.S. And that, of course, is speaking just of existential threat and not about which society it’s better to live in.
Hmm, that’s a good point. I can see how this might seem like a romantic/Marxist/anti-elite sentiment.
When I read it, I was thinking almost exclusively in terms of existential risk, the connection being that the end of the world (by, for instance, Unfriendly AI) won’t be brought about by a cruel mad scientist, but more likely by normal people trying to make economic and scientific advances without concern for the potential consequences.
Sorry if the quote doesn’t communicate that very clearly.
That might say more about how populist movements tend to work than about the character of the docile masses, to use your phrase, when raised to power. It’s rather uncommon for first-generation revolutionary leaders to come from the lower social classes: Stalin is an exception, but he’s the only one I can think of among famous communists, and in any case he arguably belonged to the second generation of his revolution. Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao all emerged from upper middle-class backgrounds, roughly speaking, although their exact circumstances differed. Fidel Castro came from an upper-class family.