You seem to have failed to notice the key point. Here’s a slight rephrasing of it: “explanations for actions will fail to reflect the actual causes of those actions to the extent that those actions are the results of nonconscious processes.”
You ask, does Gazzaniga’s explanation apply to explanations made in advance of the actions? The key point I’ve highlighted answers that question. In particular, your explanation of the actions you plan to take are (well, seem to me to be) the result of conscious processes. You consciously apprehended that you need groceries and consciously formulated a plan to fulfill that need.
It seems to me that in common usage, when a person says “I thought there was a snake” they mean something closer to, “I thought I consciously apprehended the presence of a snake,” than, “some low-level perceptual processing pattern-matched ‘snake’ and sent motor signals for retreating before I had a chance to consider the matter consciously.”
“explanations for actions will fail to reflect the actual causes of those actions to the extent that those actions are the results of nonconscious processes.”
Yes, he says that. And then he says:
listening to people’s explanations of their actions is interesting—and in the case of politicians, entertaining—but often a waste of time.
thus extending the anecdote of snakes in the grass to a parable that includes politicans’ speeches.
It seems to me that in common usage, when a person says “I thought there was a snake” they mean something closer to, “I thought I consciously apprehended the presence of a snake,” than, “some low-level perceptual processing pattern-matched ‘snake’ and sent motor signals for retreating before I had a chance to consider the matter consciously.”
Or perhaps they mean “I heard a sound that might be a snake”. As long as we’re just making up scenarios, we can slant them to favour any view of consciousness we want. This doesn’t even rise to the level of anecdote.
Obviously not, since Gazzaniga is not explaining his own actions.
He is, among other things, explaining some of his own actions: his actions of explaining his actions.
You seem to have failed to notice the key point. Here’s a slight rephrasing of it: “explanations for actions will fail to reflect the actual causes of those actions to the extent that those actions are the results of nonconscious processes.”
You ask, does Gazzaniga’s explanation apply to explanations made in advance of the actions? The key point I’ve highlighted answers that question. In particular, your explanation of the actions you plan to take are (well, seem to me to be) the result of conscious processes. You consciously apprehended that you need groceries and consciously formulated a plan to fulfill that need.
It seems to me that in common usage, when a person says “I thought there was a snake” they mean something closer to, “I thought I consciously apprehended the presence of a snake,” than, “some low-level perceptual processing pattern-matched ‘snake’ and sent motor signals for retreating before I had a chance to consider the matter consciously.”
Yes, he says that. And then he says:
thus extending the anecdote of snakes in the grass to a parable that includes politicans’ speeches.
Or perhaps they mean “I heard a sound that might be a snake”. As long as we’re just making up scenarios, we can slant them to favour any view of consciousness we want. This doesn’t even rise to the level of anecdote.