I disagree. Otherwise, prevention of suicide of the depressed is difficult to justify.
That seems like a fair summary of all moral systems according to their own standards.
On the one hand, I agree that it doesn’t narrow down the universe of acceptable moralities very much. But consider an absolute monarchist morality: Alexander’s potential is declared to be monarch of the nation, while Ivan’s is declared to be serf. All decided at birth, before knowing anything about either person. That’s not a morality that values everyone reaching their potential.
Otherwise, prevention of suicide of the depressed is difficult to justify.
Assuming one has the intuitions that creating the pig would be moral and not preventing suicide of the depressed is immoral, one may be wrong in considering them are analogous. But if they are, you gave no reason to prefer giving up the one intuition instead of the other.
I don’t think they are analogous. Depression involves unaligned preferences, perhaps always, but at least very often. If the pig’s system 1 mode of thinking wants him eaten, and system 2 mode of thinking wants him eaten, and the knife feels good to him, and his family would be happy to have him eaten, etc. all is alligned and we don’t have to solve the nature of preferences and how to rank them to say the pig’s creation and death are fine.
It seems to me that creating the pig is analogous to creating suicidal depression in a human who is not depressed.
you gave no reason to prefer giving up the one intuition instead of the other.
As a starting point, a moral theory should add up to normal. I’m not saying it’s an iron law (people once thought chattel slavery was morally normal). But the burden is on justifying the move away from normal.
I disagree. Otherwise, prevention of suicide of the depressed is difficult to justify.
On the one hand, I agree that it doesn’t narrow down the universe of acceptable moralities very much. But consider an absolute monarchist morality: Alexander’s potential is declared to be monarch of the nation, while Ivan’s is declared to be serf. All decided at birth, before knowing anything about either person. That’s not a morality that values everyone reaching their potential.
Assuming one has the intuitions that creating the pig would be moral and not preventing suicide of the depressed is immoral, one may be wrong in considering them are analogous. But if they are, you gave no reason to prefer giving up the one intuition instead of the other.
I don’t think they are analogous. Depression involves unaligned preferences, perhaps always, but at least very often. If the pig’s system 1 mode of thinking wants him eaten, and system 2 mode of thinking wants him eaten, and the knife feels good to him, and his family would be happy to have him eaten, etc. all is alligned and we don’t have to solve the nature of preferences and how to rank them to say the pig’s creation and death are fine.
It seems to me that creating the pig is analogous to creating suicidal depression in a human who is not depressed.
As a starting point, a moral theory should add up to normal. I’m not saying it’s an iron law (people once thought chattel slavery was morally normal). But the burden is on justifying the move away from normal.
Why don’t you try to think some of the many ways in which it’s NOT analogous?